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Both scholars and practitioners frequently stress the significant role played by high-
level perpetrators in cases of mass killing. Often overlooked however is that the thinking 
and behavior of these leaders are often constrained (or liberated) by what is considered to 
be acceptable or unacceptable in the cultural environment they are in. What the larger 
public considers to be normative will shape what policies leaders endorse and what 
actions they take. The dissertation examines the extent to which particular thinking 
patterns—those adopted by high-level perpetrators of democide—are normalized in 
general populations. Using cross-cultural data from the United States, India, and South 
Africa, this study measures the levels of individual endorsement of democidal statements, 
as well as the perceived acceptability of democidal statements. A primary objective of 
this study is to determine if this newly developed acceptability scale has promise as a 
better and more consistent way (as compared to the individual endorsement scale) of 
measuring exclusionary content at the societal level. Findings suggest that while an 
individual’s endorsement of democidal items is a better predictor for intended behavior 
on related issues, the acceptability scale is potentially a more novel and reliable measure 
to use across different cultures. Evidence of pluralistic ignorance taking place is also 
 v 
addressed. Understanding how these beliefs are represented in general populations may 
inform us of the political landscape that government leaders (current and/or aspiring) are 
operating in, which in turn may illustrate a population’s susceptibility to mass violence. 
This research could provide insights for eventual norm-based interventions that could 
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It is widely acknowledged that when it comes to violent conflict, exclusionary thinking 
matters. Past research, while limited, has typically focused on the exclusionary thinking of elites 
and other high-level perpetrators, and for good reason too. It is clear that what elites think and 
believe contributes to mass killing (Converse, 1964; Straus, 2015; Valentino, 2004). For over 
sixty years now, those in the field have pointed to the significance of belief systems in this 
context (for some of the seminal works, see Harff & Gurr, 1987, Kelman 1973, Kuper 1981, and 
Fein, 1984). Scholars have asserted that genocide and politicide become more likely when leaders 
and movements express an exclusionary ideology—a belief system that justifies efforts to 
persecute or eliminate certain groups of people (Harff, 2003; Pinker, 2011). In his exhaustive 
overview of genocide and mass atrocity prevention, Straus (2016) outlines four of the most 
significant, and commonly agreed upon risk factors associated with genocide and mass atrocity. 
Along with large-scale instability, armed conflict, and previous discrimination or violence, Straus 
lists ideology as one of the four significant risk factors. Belief systems or ideologies have also 
been emphasized in the atrocity-prevention world and at an international level. In the final report 
(2008) of the Genocide Prevention Task Force (co-chaired by former Secretary of State 
Madeleine K. Albright and former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen), exclusionary 
ideology is listed as one of the core risk factors of genocide or mass atrocities. The United 
Nations (UN) has also affirmed the importance of paying attention to human thinking; In the 
UN’s (2014) “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,” reasoning and ideology are listed as 
primary components of a major risk factor, “Motives or Incentives,” which they define as the 
“reasons, aims or drivers that justify the use of violence against protected groups, populations or 
individuals, including by actors outside of State borders” (p.13). The fact that these forms of 
thinking (e.g., reasons, ideologies, motives, perceptions) are recognized so widely and at such a 
high level is indicative of their relevance.  
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However, in spite of these recognitions, very little is known about the presence and 
emergence of exclusionary thinking (Brehm, 2016). Past research is primarily qualitative in 
nature and focuses on the thinking of direct perpetrators (especially high-level elites). Far too 
often the role that exclusionary thinking plays amongst the public is ignored. This overlooks and 
underestimates how the public’s thinking can shape both the political environment (in this 
context, making the societal environment riper for exclusion, discrimination or conflict), as well 
as shape leaders decision-making and behavior. Exclusively focusing on elite ideology, while 
useful, doesn’t tell us if and how such ideas or beliefs are spread amongst a population. To fully 
understand what role exclusionary thinking plays in violent conflict, we need to be able to 
examine it at both levels. And while mass participation of a population is not needed to carry out 
a program of mass killing (Valentino, 2004), it may be necessary for the majority of the 
population to not actively oppose it.  
Using the items from the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire (DMQ; Landau et al., 2020) 
to measure exclusionary thinking at the population level, the present study compares two distinct 
response scales—actual endorsement and perceived acceptability—in three different countries. 
While the endorsement scale is a standard Likert-style agreement scale (ranging from definitely 
agree to definitely disagree), the perceived acceptability scale was designed specifically for this 
study. I examine whether this acceptability scale might be a better technique for measuring 
exclusionary thinking at the aggregate societal or cultural level (rather than at the individual 
level).  
Leaders vs. the Population 
Previous research on mass violence provides evidence that the beliefs and ideologies of high-
level leaders and elites play a critical role (Chirot & McCauley, 2006; Bellamy, 2012; Kiernan, 
2007; Leader Maynard, 2014; Semelin 2007; Straus, 2015, 2016; Valentino, 2004). Mass killing 
is often an instrumental strategy that leaders use to carry out their goals, whether the goals are 
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politically, socially or economically motivated (Straus 2015; Valentino 2004). Leaders have 
power and influence and thus are in a position to broadcast their exclusionary beliefs or 
ideologies, creating deep divisions and polarization within communities. Such polarization can 
easily lead to entrenched group conflict, which is often characterized by widespread violence. 
However, it is important that we not only examine the role that leaders play, but also investigate 
the general population's acceptance of or agreement with certain beliefs. This is not to suggest 
that the population has greater influence or power over whether a mass atrocity occurs—mass 
atrocities are predominantly organized and orchestrated by governments and high-level leaders 
(Valentino 2004)—but simply to say that the population does indeed play a role (and in cases of 
mob violence or settler violence against indigenous peoples, the population may even play a 
bigger role than leaders). After all, leaders do not operate within a vacuum. Leaders are typically 
drawn from and elected by the same general population they lead and are continually socialized 
or enculturated within it. In turn, they are in a position to powerfully shape the profile of what is 
believed, disbelieved, valued, devalued and judged acceptable or unacceptable in the general 
population. And finally, they are constrained (especially in a democracy to the extent it is one) by 
what/how the general population thinks.  
The dangerous ideas or ideologies a leader espouses (ones that can help to mobilize a 
population) often utilize the pre-existing ideas and views that are held by the society (Alvarez, 
2008; Valentino, 2004). For example, the Nazi ideology drew from the already existing and 
widespread anti-Semitic views and stereotypes. As Alvarez (2008) points out, the Nazis were able 
to capitalize upon this vast reservoir of prejudice, which allowed them to portray the Jews as a 
threat to the German people. The same was true for the Rwandan Genocide—leaders were able to 
tap into the long-established perceptions regarding ethnicities (Tutsis and the Hutus) in Rwanda, 
in order to easily incite fear and division among the population. Leaders of a group take the 
shared and already existing beliefs of the society into consideration (consciously or 
subconsciously) and use these beliefs to justify their decisions and actions (Bar Tal, 2000).  
 4 
In addition, actual perpetrators—while making up only a very small proportion of the 
total population—often rely on the approval, compliance and/or indifference of the other 
members of their group (Leader Maynard and Benesch, 2016; Valentino, 2004). Even if the 
majority of the population is not likely to fully internalize or endorse extreme exclusionary or 
violent beliefs, weaker levels of internalization or endorsements can still be enough to motivate 
people to directly or indirectly participate in violence (at varying levels) or make the violence 
appear to be permissible (Leader Maynard and Benesch, 2016). Habituation could also prove to 
be key here. For a leader to act on a democidal belief, it might not be necessary for the population 
to agree (although it is beneficial if they do), it may simply be enough that the population are 
habituated or accustomed to such beliefs or actions, and don’t notice, or care to notice. This could 
mean that the more people are accustomed to exclusionary beliefs and actions, the more people 
will tolerate or comply with them. To summarize, while people might not necessarily agree with 
certain beliefs, they may still accept (or simply not oppose) them as normal in their country. It is 
this acceptance or tolerance in the general population that could give political leaders and 
governments the unopposed authority they need to implement discriminatory and often violent 
policies.  
Over time, changes in a society’s levels of acceptability of dangerous or destructive 
beliefs might reflect a society’s radicalization; people may begin to increasingly see violence as 
justified or even necessary, which in turn would further legitimize a leader's violent policies or 
actions (Leader Maynard & Benesch, 2016). Where a general population falls along the spectrum 
of approval or disapproval may be a protective or risk factor when evaluating a country’s risk for 
devolving into mass violence, such that a higher pre-existing approval in a general population 
would correspond to a higher risk for electing or acquiescing to a leader who disseminates 
exclusionary rhetoric. And it is what lies on the extreme end of the spectrum of sociopolitical 
violence that is especially salient: democide.  
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Democide  
As defined by Rummel (1994), a democide is a genocide, politicide, or any violent political or 
ethnic suppression that is organized, sanctioned, or run by the government.  In fact, the most 
prototypical cases of mass atrocity or genocide, such as those that occurred in Stalinist Russia, 
Maoist China, and Nazi Germany, were almost always democides—meaning that they were state-
led. Rummel (1994) estimates that in the 20th century, democide has caused about 169 million 
deaths.  
Although genocide is the most well recognized term used to describe mass violence, it 
has a major limitation. As it is outlined in the U.N. Genocide Convention, genocide can only 
apply to four specific types of groups: national, ethnical, racial, or religious. Many scholars have 
noted that such narrowness fails to include other legitimate groups that face the same acts listed in 
the Convention. For example, in Stalinist Soviet Union, Indonesia in 1965 and the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia, large-scale violence against civilians took place. However, in the Soviet Union, the 
intention was to destroy groups based on economic class. In Indonesia, the intention was to 
destroy groups based on political party. And in Cambodia, the intention was to destroy groups 
based on a urban vs. rural divide, and also based on education level (Straus, 2016). Despite the 
extensiveness and the group-destructive nature of the violence, these three cases do not meet the 
criteria of genocide according to the U.N. Genocide Convention for the groups that were target 
were not national, ethnical, racial or religious.  
According to Rummel (1994), the term democide accounts for this limitation, for it 
includes forms of government murder not covered by the term genocide. Rummel’s exact 
definition of democide—“the murder of any person or people by a government, including 
genocide, politicide, or mass murder”— is a bit too broad in scope, as even a single murder could 
be classified as democide. For this reason I adopt Saucier and Aker’s (2018) refined definition of 
democide for the purpose of this study, in which, building upon Rummel’s definition, they define 
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democide as the, “systematic killing of large numbers of noncombatant (civilian) individuals' ' (p. 
81). This standard allows for some flexibility, especially as it pertains to the group-selective 
criterion (i.e., it is not limited to the four groups that genocide lists). This definition also mirrors 
the criteria set out by Straus (2016), which suggests that to be classified as a mass atrocity, the 
killing must be systematic, large scale, and towards civilians. Of course, the key feature of 
democide is the emphasis that is placed on the violence being state-led. Governments, naturally, 
have the resources, structure, legitimacy and power to accomplish widespread and systematic 
killing. The total control by the state gives the government, as Max Weber says, the “monopoly 
of legitimate use of physical force,” which presents them with the “right” to use that physical 
force (2013, p. 78). In addition, the state also allows for pervasive governmental control and 
mobilization of humans, both of which are useful when attempting to target large numbers of 
people within a country. And although, democide is a major problem—indeed, by Rummel’s 
(n.d.) estimates, 262,000,000 people have died from democide in the 20th century alone— no 
individual-level assessment tools have been developed to measure and monitor democidal 
thinking.   
The Democidal Mindset. Saucier and Akers (2018) examined the thinking patterns 
adopted by high-level perpetrators of democide. They analyzed a corpus of texts/statements from 
20 prominent cases of democide across cultures and time periods, and found 20 typical themes 
(e.g., dehumanization, polarized thinking, in-group idealization). Building on this work, Landau 
et al. (2020) utilized their database of extracted statements to develop the Democidal Mindset 
Questionnaire (DMQ). The DMQ presents a set of statements based on those made historically by 
democide-perpetrators and allows an individual to respond to how much they agree or disagree 
with each item. The DMQ statements are largely statements of belief or of what rules/norms of 
behavior should be, statements that are usually include connotations about the valuing of an in-
group, or (more often) devaluing of an out-group. A 10-factor model of the DMQ items showed 
promise predicting outcomes relevant to democide (e.g., concerns about terrorism, crime, 
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corruption, moral decline, economic inequality, and intergroup conflict; Landau et al., 2020). 
These 10 factors are: xenophobia, traitor talk, sabotage, wealthy elites, proviolence, support of 
torture, polarized thinking, in-group idealization, purity of thought and racialist views (see 
Appendix A). Due to the fact that many of these factors or thinking patterns are quite common 
and can be seen in everyday language, it is possible, that it is the combination that makes them 
dangerous. Kiernan (2003), for example, refers to such a combination (in his case, of ideologies) 
as an “explosive mixture,” likening it to a chemical reaction created by mixing certain 
compounds. This is an effective analogy, for the compounds or thinking patterns in other forms of 
conflict (e.g., civil war) or situations (e.g., of racism) might differ from those found in cases of 
democide, and in turn, may be the reason the mixture is so explosive. 
Overall, these themes tend to represent various manifestations of exclusionary thinking 
concerning an out-group. While the questionnaire is specifically designed to measure the type of 
thinking that is typically associated with democides (i.e., democidal thinking), more broadly 
speaking, it measures exclusionary thinking. This assessment tool should prove to be useful for 
detecting exclusionary thinking (even at a milder level) in contexts outside of mass violence.  
The DMQ highlights the significance that the thinking patterns of high-level perpetrators 
play (since each item is based on a direct statement made by a high-level figure), while also 
giving one the ability to investigate how this thinking is displayed amongst the public. And while 
high-level perpetrators-in-the-making (and of course actual perpetrators) are more likely to 
display these thinking patterns, it is likely that these same patterns could be distributed among the 
population (albeit at mostly lower levels than in democide-perpetrators). Just as one would need 
to examine clinically diagnosed psychopaths in order to create a tool to measure levels of 
psychopathy in the population, the DMQ was created based on an examination of perpetrators’ 
thinking, with the goal of measuring levels of democidal thinking in the population.  
The full set of DMQ items (i.e., 10 themes) are used in the present study, along with an 
add-on theme (identified by Landau et al., 2020, post hoc) that covers content related to in-group 
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blamelessness (see Appendix A). These items are utilized in the present study in two different 
ways. Using a similar response scale to the what was used by Landau (2020) to derive the 10-
factor DMQ model, the first questionnaire measures an individual’s personal endorsement (i.e., 
agreement or disagreement) of these items or statements; this measure is labeled the DMQ-E. The 
second questionnaire uses a newly designed response scale to measure the perceived acceptability 
of these statements in a country; this measure is labeled the DMQ-A. Measuring the perceived 
acceptability should reveal the population’s general level of approval or disapproval of these 
beliefs. Emphasis is placed on what is perceived, for this scale does not ask participants to 
respond with their own personal level of agreement or approval, but rather asks participants to 
indicate how acceptable each statement is in their country (similar to Noelle-Neumann, 1974). 
People in a country are expected to converge on their ratings (reasons for this are discussed in a 
later section), and in turn, produce a general population score. Both versions of these measures 
should give one a better understanding of the normalization of various aspects of the democidal 
mindset in specific countries.  
The Public & Perceived Acceptability  
As mentioned, this study addresses the levels of exclusionary thinking at both the individual level 
(personal endorsement), and the societal level (perceived acceptability). There are important 
differences between these two levels, but, ultimately, both are utilized by people to understand 
and interpret the world, as well as to regulate emotions and behavior (Eidelson & Eidelson, 
2003). Unfortunately, dangerous thinking at either the individual level or the societal/cultural 
level can be equally destructive. After all, individuals are influenced not only by their own 
sincere beliefs, but also by their perception of the beliefs within their social environment (Leader 
Maynard, 2019). For example, although an individual might hold the belief that throwing a half-
eaten piece of fruit onto the ground is acceptable—as it will likely decompose quickly and 
provide nutrients to the soil—they may also recognize that littering is perceived negatively in 
 9 
their society and decide not to discard their food in this manner. A less innocuous example: An 
individual could believe that helping out a person in need, regardless of what group they belong 
to, is the right thing to do, but they may also recognize that people from a certain group are 
viewed as traitors in their community or society, and therefore decide not to help them.   
 In order to study the thinking patterns or belief systems present in the broader societal or 
cultural environment, a new response scale was designed. In this section I discuss the relevant 
components and theories behind the development of the acceptability response scale. The 
inclusion of a response scale was inspired by the Overton-window model, and further reinforced 
by an understanding of cultural theories, and other relevant theories from psychology and 
political science. The first part of this section introduces the Overton-window model, 
summarizing how public opinion can shape politics and can constrain political actors. In the 
second part, I discuss how culture and cultural components (e.g., beliefs, values, norms) provide 
us with additional support and show how they may influence thinking and behavior. And finally, 
I examine how the “spiral of silence” and pluralistic ignorance may contribute to this dynamic.  
The Overton Window 
While considering ways in which one might investigate the distribution of aspects of the 
Democidal Mindset among a population, the Overton-window model was deemed relevant. The 
Overton window illustrates how public opinion/attitudes may inform and shape the general 
political sphere of a society. The model goes beyond the ideological approach (i.e., how much 
does an individual or group endorse or internalize certain exclusionary beliefs). Arguably it goes 
from an ideological approach to a cultural one. It further suggests how a society’s level of 
acceptability (or disapproval) of an idea may directly shape the decisions political leaders can 
make, and in turn influence the policies that are adopted in that society.  
The Overton window is a model derived informally in public-policy circles, which 
explains how ideas change in society and how they impact politics (The Mackinac Center for 
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Public Policy, n.d). The 
model suggests that 
politicians are 
constrained by the ideas 
that they are able to 
support by having to 
typically support policies 
that are widely accepted by the current society. These policy ideas progress through being viewed 
as acceptable, then sensible, then popular, before eventually become policy. The range of 
acceptable ideas that are available to politicians “are shaped by ideas, social movements and 
shared norms and values within society” (The Mackinac Center for Public Policy, n.d.). Policy 
ideas outside of the Overton window are considered to be radical or unthinkable. More practically 
speaking, the Overton window provides a sequential roadmap for public attitude and policy 
change, by pointing out how one could incrementally shift public opinion. See Figure 1 for an 
illustration of the Overton Window and the varying degrees/levels of acceptance. 
The Overton window is not fixed, meaning it can shift up or down (or left to right as 
Figure 1 depicts), and it can also expand, allowing for more fringe ideas to fall within the 
acceptable range. Prohibition in the United States, a nationwide ban on the production and sale of 
alcohol from 1920 to 1933, provides us with a good example of the Overton window. In the 
beginning of the 20th century, the idea of prohibition began to gain traction and grew into a 
movement that spread across the country. Ultimately, the prohibition movement became so 
popular, it led politicians to amend the United States Constitution in 1920, which enforced the 
ban on alcohol. What makes Prohibition such a good example of the Overton window, is not only 
can we see how an idea can eventually come to be accepted, increase in popularity and finally 
lead to policy, but we can also see how that same idea can decline in public acceptability, 
eventually leading to its repeal in 1933, and ultimately to this day, considered to be a fringe or 
Figure 1. The Overton Window 
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unthinkable idea. While the Prohibition Era serves as a good example to showcase how public 
opinion, and in turn, political actions can change, there are more recent examples to consider. In 
the past ten years, we have seen such shifts in the Overton window regarding issues around 
transgender rights, taking action to prevent climate change, gay marriage, the MeToo movement 
and the Black Lives Matter movement. The rise of certain political leaders and the ideas they 
promote is also evidence of how public opinion has shifted. United States Senator Bernie Sanders 
is proof of this. For a large faction on the left, Socialism is not a dirty word anymore—
progressive policy ideas such as Medicare for all, free public college education, and increased 
taxation of the rich are all discussed in mainstream circles now (Astor, 2019, February 26). To 
quote Sanders directly, he states, “We have come a very, very long way in the American people 
now demanding legislation and concepts that just a few years ago were thought to be very 
radical” (Astor, 2019, February 26). These shifts have not been restricted to the left, however. 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, his subsequent election and his time in office, provide 
even clearer evidence that ideas that were maybe once considered to be radical (or even morally 
wrong) are now accepted by many, and tolerated by even more. Trump's racist, sexist, anti-
immigrant rhetoric, and in some cases, policies, may reflect a surge of exclusionary thinking in 
the population. In similar language to that of the Overton window, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
also suggest that Trump’s assault on basic democratic norms has, “expanded the bounds of 
acceptable political behavior” (p. 202). They go on to say that even if Trump hasn’t broken the 
“guardrails of democracy,” he certainly has increased the likelihood that a future president will. 
Some claim that Trump himself has shattered or smashed the Overton window entirely, allowing 
for any fringe idea to be put on the table and considered (e.g., registration of Muslims, bans on 
Muslims entering the country, mass deportation, walling off the United States’ southern border at 
Mexico’s expense) (French, 2015; Robertson, 2018). While this may be true, it is important to 
note that it is unlikely that Trump made people suddenly more racist or xenophobic than they 
already were. However, what he may have done, which is equally as important, is to legitimize 
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extreme views that had been lying dormant in sizeable sectors of the population. Shifts such as 
these illustrate how ideas or beliefs in the population can change—for better or for worse. As we 
have seen recently, these shifts can give rise to far-right or alt-right movements, which in turn 
could set up a favorable attitudinal background for a more oppressive government.  
For research on democide, the Overton-window approach is particularly worthy of 
consideration. Democides are orchestrated by governments, meaning that the perpetrators of 
democide are typically high-level government officials (e.g., politicians, military leaders). In this 
study, the Overton window is used as a framework in support of the premise that the 
normalization of democidal beliefs in a society could be a powerful indicator of the policies that 
society’s leaders may feel newly unconstrained to adopt and of the likelihood that the population 
might tolerate democidal actions. The response scale used for the DMQ-A was designed with the 
Overton window in mind, and indexes varying degrees of acceptance (see Appendix B).  
On the other hand, more optimistically, the Overton window may also have implications 
for the prevention of mass violence. As illustrated, it is possible for the window to shift, so the 
challenge for activists and practitioners is to move the window in their desired direction. For 
example, if it appears that a population views certain discriminatory policies of an out-group as 
“sensible,” then international or local nonprofits may begin to target their efforts into making 
those policies appear less sensible, and merely only acceptable, and from there, they might work 
on making them appear radical. This is also a process of delegitimizing dangerous beliefs, which 
has been shown to be successful (Collier & Vicente, 2013). This process is not easily 
accomplished and would most likely need to be a gradual and long-term effort that locally based 
experts and organizations would spearhead.  
The Relevance of Culture  
So, what does it mean to measure perceptions of acceptability in this way? What do we 
have in mind when we ask people to rate how certain ideas are viewed in their society? As it 
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happens, we are actually tapping into culture here. Culture can be defined as the ideas, beliefs, 
values and norms that are widely shared by a group (Hill, 2009). While beliefs, values and norms 
are represented in individual mindsets, when they are aggregated (or shared) they make up what 
is cultural (Romney et al., 1986; Saucier, 2013). Accordingly, culture can be said to be distributed 
across mindsets in a population. Certain disciplines have incorporated this view of culture into 
their methods. In anthropology for example, it is common practice for researchers doing 
fieldwork to treat their informants' response as probabilistic in nature. In other words, the more 
people agree on an answer (when surveyed independently), the more likely that answer is to be 
the “correct cultural response” (Romney et al., 1986, p. 314). This consensus-type approach 
allows one to gather cultural information from the minds of its members. In line with Romney et 
al.’s (1986) consensus model, the present study's newly developed perceived-acceptability 
response scale, DMQ-A, attempts to uncover the consensus level of democidal thinking in a 
society. By surveying a participant’s knowledge of how accepted certain democidal statements 
are in their society, and then seeing where participants converge, one should be able to procure an 
estimate of the degree to which these aspects are normalized in that society. In this way, 
measuring the degree of acceptance of aspects of the Democidal Mindset (comprising beliefs, 
values and norms), corresponds to measuring a ‘pro-democidal culture’ among that society. As 
culture is distributed across mindsets in the population to a lesser or greater degree (see Schwartz, 
1978), so too would be a ‘pro-democidal culture’ (or anti-democidal culture on the other hand).  
Culture can explain the mechanisms that make it possible for certain ideas or belief 
systems to be normalized (or denormalized) across societies. Beliefs, values and norms are three 
key components that influence people’s thinking and guide behavior. The beliefs that a collective 
hold differentiates them from other groups and can define their very essence as a group (Bar Tal, 
2000). Shared beliefs emerge from shared experiences and socialization, and in turn, are used as 
templates through which a group or its members interpret future shared experiences and events 
(Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). In addition, individuals actively compare their beliefs with their 
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fellow group members to establish their own social reality (Festinger, 1954, as cited in Bar Tal, 
2000, p. 122). Shared beliefs can, inter alia, influence the social reality of the group, the bond 
group members feel towards one another, the conformity expected from group members and the 
actions that the group and its leader take. According to Schwartz and Bardi (2001), values are 
“desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in 
people’s lives” (p. 269). Values are important for they motivate and control behavior and 
ultimately can define what is and what is not socially appropriate behavior (Schwartz & Bardi, 
2001). In addition, social actors (e.g., leaders) can invoke values to justify their own demands of 
others and also to arouse desired behaviors. Social norms are expectations and preferences that 
guide people’s behavior, laying out obligations and expectations for people to follow. Not only do 
we expect others to conform to these norms, we also understand that we are expected to conform 
(Bicchieri, 2006). Another important aspect of social norms (especially in the context of the 
current study) is that they rely on perceptions: perceptions of how most others would behave, and 
also how most others would sanction one's conduct (Reno, Cialdini & Kallgren, 1993). All of 
these cultural components play a significant role in shaping our social world.    
In order for shared beliefs, values and social norms to be socially significant and 
influential, mutual awareness and conformity are key. Firstly, group members must be aware that 
beliefs and norms are shared by other members (Bar Tal, 2000; Bicchieri, 2006). Such awareness 
can strengthen beliefs; making members feel more confident in their beliefs as well as increasing 
the sense of similarity or solidarity they feel with their fellow group members. This is also the 
case for social norms. For a social norm to exist, a substantial number of people must believe in it 
and expect others to follow it (Bicchieri, 2006). Secondly, conformity is another requisite for the 
efficacy of shared beliefs. Groups exert pressure on their members—especially members who 
deviate from the norm—to confirm and adopt shared beliefs. It is interesting to note, especially 
given the focus of this study, that conformity can be particularly high during periods of intense 
threat or tension—group members have more “punitive and unforgiving reactions toward in-
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group members who hold dissenting views at such times” (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003, pp. 189). 
Both awareness and conformity can give a group a sense of power, and ultimately may guide the 
actions they decide to take as a group. A group’s leaders will also take these shared beliefs into 
consideration and will use them to justify their actions or decisions, which I will discuss in more 
depth in a later section.  
The influence of shared systems of beliefs, values and norms is not dependent on an 
individual’s actual commitment to or endorsement of those beliefs (although it certainly helps). 
As Leader Maynard (2019) suggests when discussing ideology (i.e., belief systems that are often 
political), even in the absence of sincere convictions to beliefs, widespread expectations regarding 
belief systems can continue to shape public behavior—large numbers of “true believers” are not 
required. If people expect that others will follow an ideology, then they are incentivized to do the 
same, and this in turn can sustain the ideology (I touch upon this again when discussing 
pluralistic ignorance).  
Consequently, measuring a country’s acceptability of democidal beliefs should give us a 
better idea of the shared beliefs, values and social norms of the group (i.e., relevant cultural 
aspects of the moment), the pressure members might feel to conform, as well as give us insights 
into the potential actions that group, or its leader may decide to take.  
Another relevant aspect to consider is how culture changes over time. Culture changes 
progressively as more mindsets change, giving way for ideas or beliefs to become normalized or 
abnormalized. Democidal thinking is likely to operate in a similar manner; societies may 
experience periods in which more people view such ideas as acceptable (or at least tolerate them), 
and periods in which such ideas are considered abhorrent. Once again, this mirrors the Overton-
window model, showing how the acceptability of certain ideas might shift over time.  
As Sperber’s (1996) epidemiological model of culture illustrates, some sets of beliefs 
(“sets of representations” in Sperber’s words), are relatively endemic, and are transmitted 
gradually through many generations and are generally long-lived, while others can operate much 
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like an epidemic, and spread rapidly through a population with a short life-span. While a ‘pro-
democidal culture’ could be both, it might function more like an epidemic, especially at its height. 
Certain sets of beliefs may build up over time (e.g., racist attitudes towards a group), but under 
the right circumstances, these pre-existing beliefs, potentially coupled with newer beliefs (e.g., 
views that a certain group is controlling the government, or stealing women, or need to be dealt 
with forcibly) become ‘contagious’ or catchy and can reproduce rapidly amongst the population. 
In addition, humans might also have certain dispositions, that while technically are adaptive, 
might also make us susceptible to maladaptive or harmful ideas or beliefs. Sperber notes that 
susceptibilities such as these may “reveal themselves only as a result of a change in 
environmental conditions” (Sperber, 1996, p.67). That is to say, aspects of the democidal mindset 
might be akin to susceptibilities; for example, humans may have a disposition for out-group vs. 
in-group categorization, which can be adaptive for many reasons, but this disposition might in 
turn make us susceptible to more extreme levels of this thinking (e.g., xenophobic attitudes, 
dehumanizing the out-group, and so on).  
The Spiral of Silence & Pluralistic Ignorance 
As this study asks participants to estimate their perceptions of the public’s views, it is necessary 
to address theories of social perception, and more specifically, pluralistic ignorance and the spiral 
of silence. Both of these theories demonstrate why measuring people’s perceptions of 
acceptability (rather than just their individual opinions) might be particularly valuable.  
Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) “spiral of silence” is an important theory to consider first. The 
spiral of silence suggests that people's perceptions of the distribution of public opinions 
influences their willingness to express their own opinions. When individuals express (or don’t 
express) opinions, the environment of opinions is in turn altered—causing those who believe they 
are in the majority to be more willing to speak out, and those who believe they are in the minority 
to remain silent, thus creating a spiral of silence. So, while our private opinions are more or less 
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constant (at least they are in the short run, as we don’t change opinions very quickly), our 
willingness to express our opinions changes depending on our perceptions (Taylor, 1982). In 
essence, public opinion is changed by this “perceptual process” (Taylor, 1982, pp. 312).1 
While the theory of the spiral of silence illustrates that public opinion and public 
expression are influenced by perceptions of others' opinions, pluralistic ignorance shows us that 
oftentimes these perceptions are incorrect.  Pluralistic ignorance is what occurs when the majority 
of individuals in a group misperceive other’s opinions, mistakenly assuming that others do not 
share their own views (Prentice & Miller, 1993). Studies have illustrated this phenomenon taking 
place in a vast array of contexts: alcohol consumption on university campuses, gay-bashing, 
racial segregation in the American South, honor killings of women in Islamic society, and 
willingness to discuss climate change (Geiger & Swim, 2016; Pinker, 2011).  People may endorse 
a belief even if they personally disagree—falsely thinking that everyone else favors it. In 
addition, due to pluralistic ignorance, people have been shown to actually change their attitudes, 
shifting towards the misperceived norm (Prentice & Miller, 1993). Out of pressure, and perhaps a 
desire to conform, and the fear of being judged or punished, pluralistic ignorance can also affect 
behavior. People have a tendency to rely on the behavior of others to identify norms, and in 
situations where misinformation is widespread, people may feel pressured to comply with the 
misperceived norm: “Their own behavior may be driven by social pressure [rather than by their 
feelings], but they assume that other people's identical behavior is an accurate reflection of their 
true feelings [and not due to social pressure]” (Prentice & Miller, 1993, p. 244).   
It is one thing for an individual or a group to conform out of social pressure, but it is 
another thing for them to actively enforce (e.g., advocate, promote, or pressure others to comply 
with) a belief or the coinciding norms. Conforming out of social pressure is not the same as 
actively enforcing beliefs and their coinciding norms. Why would people publicly enforce a norm 
 
1 Much like the current study, Noelle-Neumann (1974) asked participants to rate their perceptions of the 
majority opinion in their country on certain issues. 
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that they privately deplore? In essence, people can become trapped in pluralistic ignorance—
incorrectly assuming that the majority would enforce the norm, when few actually would 
(Centola, Willer & Macy, 2005). Using computational simulations, Centola, Willer and Macy 
(2005) demonstrated how a false consensus can spread through an entire society and cause false 
compliance and false enforcement of a seemingly unpopular norm. The key factors here appear to 
be social connectedness and the distribution of true believers (those who hold the belief privately 
and sincerely support the norm) in the society. When true believers were clustered together in a 
smaller area, they were able to enforce the norm amongst their fellow neighbors (Centola, Willer 
& Macy, 2005). Moreover, a particularly visible or ‘loud’ cluster of true believers may have even 
more of an effect (even if their beliefs are deviant compared to the rest of the population) on 
compliance. This seems to support the spiral of silence theory as well; in areas where people are 
the majority (or even just perceive themselves to be), they are able to enforce their beliefs and 
norms more easily, owing to the fact that the minority remains silent as they too are aware of the 
distribution of opinions.  
For the present study, the spiral of silence and pluralistic ignorance might occur—
participants might respond that the citizens in their country think more extremely than they 
actually do. In addition, these misconceptions might in turn lead some people to believe they are 
the majority and others that they are the minority, encouraging some to express their opinions, 
and others to stay silent. What could this mean for the results? Even if the population does report  
a “false” level of consensual endorsement of democidal beliefs, this still informs us of their 
perceived reality, which is ultimately of interest here. The aim of the research is to determine the 
perceived normalization of democidal beliefs amongst the population. If the perception is that 
democidal beliefs are highly accepted in their country (even if this is not the case), then the 
pressure to conform, adhere to, and enforce those beliefs should also be high, and in turn may 
increase the country’s risk for discrimination or violence.  
 19 
“Dark Side of Democracy” & Country Context  
There is a strong case for studying democidal thinking in democracies as well as in 
dictatorships. When one thinks of campaigns of mass killing, we usually associate them with 
dictatorships and other forms of authoritarian regimes. While this has often been the case, some 
of the most violent and memorable cases occurred in nations that at the time were to some degree, 
democratic. For example, Hitler gained popularity and influence when Germany was governed by 
the Weimar republic—a representative democracy that held genuine elections. Although Hitler 
himself was not elected into office (he was appointed by other elected officials), he did come to 
power legally. Within weeks of becoming chancellor, Hitler began to dismantle any form of 
democracy, first by introducing the Enabling Act, which allowed him and his party to pass laws 
without the approval of Germany’s Parliament (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
n.d.). Like other forms of government, democratic governments also have their weaknesses. 
Unfortunately, we often misattribute absolute equality and stability to democracy. This is a 
comforting illusion, but it has potential consequences. A failure to acknowledge the fragility of 
democracies may leave us ill-prepared and blindsided to the strategic dismantling or manipulation 
of democratic laws and policies. It seems more important than ever to assess our own democratic 
institutions for democidal undertones.  
There are three primary reasons why it is worthwhile to study democracies in this 
context. The first is that in a democracy, the public plays a bigger role in politics and political 
behavior than it does in a nondemocratic society. In a non-democracy, rulers can more forcefully 
and with less constraint, reign over a population, so public opinion or the Overton window, while 
still relevant, have a more subdued impact.  The second is that democracies are not as harmless as 
we believe them to be—they often carry with them the potential for the majority to oppress the 
minority, or vice versa, for an elected minority to dominate the majority. And third, is that 
democracies are also not as indestructible as we assume them to be. Throughout history there are 
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numerous examples of democracies that have been subverted or destroyed—most often at the 
hands of an elected popular “outsider,” i.e., a person typically outside of the traditional political 
establishment.  
As the present study focuses on the beliefs that a population holds, examining democratic 
countries was key. In democracies, “the people” have more say than they do in an authoritarian 
regime. More so than in a government controlled by a small group of powerful people, in a 
democracy, power is determined heavily by the perception of numbers (i.e., people; Converse, 
1964). In other words, if a large number of people are perceived to be in support of (or opposed 
to) an idea, policy, movement, person or so on, then that means something—more directly than it 
does in an authoritarian-like system. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) systems 
of governments can be broken down into three important dimensions or groups: the nominal 
selectorate or “interchangeables,” which includes every person who has some sort of say in who 
gets chosen as a leader (e.g., in the U.S., this would be every person who is able to vote); the real 
selectorate or “influentials,” the group that actually chooses the leader and whose support is truly 
influential; and finally, the winning coalition or “essentials,” whose support is essential to the 
leader staying in power. They believe that variations in the sizes of these groups can explain a 
great deal of what goes on in politics, and that the sizes of these groups shape how limited or 
liberated a leader is. Within an autocracy or a dictatorship, the government is made up of a small 
group of essentials, that are typically drawn from a very large group of interchangeables and a 
relatively small group of influentials. On the other hand, in a democracy, the government is 
formed from both a very large group of essentials and a very large group of interchangeables, 
with a group of influentials just as big. Thus, as their ability to stay in power depends on it, 
elected officials in a democracy have to garner the support of far more people than they would in 
a dictatorship. This is not to say that the people have a tremendous amount of power in a 
democracy (for it is as usual, the elites who have disproportionate control), but more to say that 
the leaders tend to be more responsive to larger numbers of the public. It stands to reason then, 
 21 
that the belief systems of a population should also play a greater role in shaping the political 
landscape in democratic societies.  
While these conditions would appear to protect a democratic society from the issues that 
authoritarian regimes face, democracies too have a dark side. One may argue that this “dark side” 
is even more sinister than a straight-forward dictatorship. Democracy evokes feelings of safety, 
comfort, security, leaving us blind to the exclusionary behavior that may be present in a given 
population. This blindness can leave thinking patterns and behavior unchecked until it is too late. 
According to sociologist Michael Mann (2005), murderous cleansing is the “dark side of 
democracy,” for democracy always carries with it the potential that the majority might tyrannize 
the minority. Democracy is by definition, “the rule of the ordinary people” (i.e., the masses). But 
as Mann points out, when the people or the nation are defined in ethnic terms (or other terms for 
that matter), as they often are, then there is a problem—what happens to those of different 
ethnicities? It is true that many democracies have checks and balances in place, and so it is very 
unlikely that a program of mass killing will unfold in a longstanding, stable democracy (Easterly, 
Gatti & Kurlat, 2006; Mann, 2005). But, while stable democracies are typically safe or tend to be 
at lower risk, unstable or new democracies are not. In fact, regimes newly embarked upon 
democratization are even more likely to commit murderous cleansing than are stable 
authoritarian regimes (Mann p. 4).  
And finally, democracies can be hijacked by a leader or party with authoritarian 
tendencies. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) blatant dictatorships don’t occur anymore, 
and military coups are rare. Yet democracies still die. Democratically elected officials can subvert 
democracies—in ways that are often legal—from within, using the very checks and balances 
designed to uphold democratic institutions to destroy them. Svolik (2014, 2019) too suggests that 
while democracies (esp. long-established ones) are often protected against military coups, 
“incumbent takeovers” (i.e., when an elected incumbent begins to undermine the tenants of 
democracy) are the most common form of democratic breakdown.  Elected autocrats kill 
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democracy by “packing and ‘weaponizing’ the courts and other neutral agencies, buying off the 
media and the private sector (or bullying them into silence), and rewriting the rules of politics to 
tilt the playing field against opponents” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p.8). It is this form of 
democratic perversion or decay that we should be on the lookout for. Indeed, it would appear that 
democracies do not make a government or its people immune to falling into the same toxic 
thinking that we have seen repeated over and over in cases of mass killing.  
As Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) state, the breakdown of democracy “often begins with 
words”—leaders attack their critics or other groups using charged and oftentimes derogatory 
terms (i.e., traitors, enemies, terrorists), and when the public starts to share the same views, then it 
becomes much easier for the leader or the government to justify taking action against them. This 
critical interplay between the rhetoric of leaders and the people is at the heart of what makes the 
present study relevant.  
 
United States 
The United States is a particularly interesting country to investigate due to its current political 
climate and (as of the end of December 2020) president. Since the 1980’s the United States has 
increasingly become more divided along political partisan lines. This has resulted in a deeply 
polarized society. According to Carothers and O'Donohue (2019, September 25), partisan 
sentiment emerged from the bottom up and not the top down. A series of cultural movements in 
the late 20th century (e.g., civil rights movement, women’s’ rights movement, anti-Vietnam War 
movement and the sexual revolution) drastically altered the social culture of the U.S.—changing 
or replacing beliefs, values and norms. Polarization, Carothers and O'Donohue assert, was driven 
by the social activists, evangelists, and public intellectuals of this time, and only later was 
reflected amongst the political parties. This exemplifies how social movements can influence 
culture, and in turn influence politics. It also supports the theory behind the Overton window—
the opinions or beliefs that the public holds can shape the political realm. However, as Carothers 
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and O'Donohue go on to say, political elites have the ability to easily reverse or moderate 
polarization in their country if they truly wish to. Or as they say about the current president of the 
U.S., leaders can take up polarization as a weapon and wield it “as a core political strategy” 
(Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019, September 25). Southern Poverty Law Center holds that the 
upswing in radical right-wing and white nationalist rallies can be credited to Trump’s rise to 
power, and more specifically, his divisive rhetoric (Miller & Graves, 2020, August 10). He 
instilled a sense of legitimacy among these extremist groups and justified their exclusionary 
beliefs. In addition, a particular frightening feature of Trump’s approach is that he often tolerates 
or encourages violence. This is usually a precursor of democratic breakdown (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 
2018). Particularly during his campaign, he openly encouraged his supporters to instigate 
violence and physically remove dissenters. As is known from the literature on mass killing, 
incitements of violence and calls to arms are central to mobilizing people (mostly military or 
paramilitary groups).  
 
South Africa 
Democratic voting was first introduced to South Africa in 1994, ultimately putting an end to the 
legalized racism that was Apartheid. The first democratic elections were met with overwhelming 
joy in the 1990s, however, almost thirty years later, how has democracy held up? Among other 
struggles, what South Africa appears to be wrestling with currently are rising levels of 
xenophobia. A Pew Research poll conducted in 2018 stated that 62% of South Africans viewed 
immigrants as taking their jobs and social benefits and 61% of South Africans thought that 
immigrants were more responsible for crime than locals (Tamir & Budiman, 2019, May 3). The 
rising levels of xenophobia may be due in part to the increasing numbers of immigrants. From 
2005 to 2019 the number of immigrants jumped from 3% to 7%. South Africa is often a preferred 
destination for migrants coming from other African countries, as it is one of the few countries in 
Africa with a middle-level economy and therefore, more job opportunities. Similar to emigrants 
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from Mexico, and Latin America trying desperately to get into the United States, despite 
detentions and deportation, immigrants coming to South Africa are also seeking better 
opportunities and/or fleeing from unsafe living conditions. Sadly, these immigrants are not 
always welcome in South Africa. Over the past two decades, there have been countless incidents 
of xenophobic harassment and attacks, many of them resulting in deaths. For example, in May 
2008, in Johannesburg, xenophobic violence broke out against foreigners and migrants, especially 
migrants coming from Zimbabwe (Human Rights Watch, 2008, May 22). This violence soon 
spread to other provinces, and in total, 62 people died, and many businesses and homes were 
destroyed by rioters. Xenophobic attacks peaked again in April 2015 and in September 2019 
(BBC, 2019). As is often the case in other countries, immigrants and foreigners—mostly migrants 
from other African countries—are being blamed for South Africa’s social and economic woes. 
According to a recent Human Rights Watch report (Ueda, 2020, September 17), the violent mobs, 
which typically have been made up of Black South Africans, are individuals who are “angry at 
the economic and living conditions they are experiencing – poverty and inequality, chronically 
high unemployment, high crime rates, and poor public services”. While South Africa has 
implemented its National Action Plan to combat xenophobia, it has unfortunately failed to hold 
anyone accountable for the past xenophobic crimes (Mavhinga, 2019, March 25).  
 
India  
Like most countries, discrimination and violence are not new concepts in India. India’s caste 
system is one of the most enduring hierarchical structures in the world and has contributed to the 
inequality faced by many of its citizens. Mob violence against Muslims and other minority groups 
is a long-standing problem in India. Over the past decade or so, India has seen a great deal of 
vigilante violence against those who consume beef or facilitate beef consumption. And since 
coming to power in 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, has spurred this violence through their inflammatory rhetoric. As a result, 
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“Between May 2015 and December 2018, at least 44 people—36 of them Muslims—were killed 
across 12 Indian states. Over that same period, around 280 people were injured in over 100 
different incidents across 20 states” (Bajoria, 2019, February 18). The attacks appear to have been 
led by “so-called cow protection groups” which seem to be connected with militant Hindu groups 
and the BJP. The victims, on the other hand, are predominantly Muslims, Dalits (formerly known 
as “untouchables”) and Adivasis (indigenous communities). 
Since Narendra Modi’s election in 2014, he has implemented a handful of controversial 
and exclusionary policies. The most infamous of these policies is the Citizenship Amendment Bill 
that was passed in December 2019. Essentially, the law makes it possible for previously 
prohibited illegal immigrants to become citizens (Chaudhry, 2019, December 13). The big caveat 
to this law is that it only allows Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsees, and Christians, who 
migrated to India from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan to become citizens. Clearly 
excluded from this list of protected groups are Muslims. Soon after the bill was passed, the 
country broke out into (mostly peaceful) protests, objecting that this new law was 
unconstitutional as it treats Muslims differently from other religious groups. In February 2020, 
after a government official (also from Modi’s party) publicly declared that he would have police 
remove “anti-government” protesters, ordinary citizens (largely Hindu nationalists) took matters 
into their own hands. On February 23, violent riots erupted in northeastern New Delhi. The target 
was not seemingly these protestors, but instead, were primarily Muslims and Muslim homes, 
businesses, and places of worship. In total, 53 people died. This violence also happened to 
coincide with President Donald Trump’s inaugural visit to India. And with the addition of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, some fear that this “erosion of democratic values may go unnoticed” 
(Ganguly, 2020, September 18). This might well happen, for as Levitsky and Ziblatt point out, 
“Citizens become more likely to tolerate, and even endorse authoritarian measures when they fear 
for their security” (p. 192). 
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Purpose of this Study 
The current study sets forth to examine the degree to which various aspects of the Democidal 
Mindset are normalized in three different countries. For comparison, I examine both the actual 
levels of individual endorsement of democidal statements, as well as the perceived acceptability 
of democidal statements. A leader’s beliefs and actions will have far greater impact in these 
contexts than the ordinary member of a population. For this reason, detecting the normative 
framework (i.e., what is considered to be acceptable or unacceptable) within which leaders are 
operating in, might prove to be more informative than merely studying individual belief-
endorsements. Thus, a primary objective of this study is to see if this newly developed 
acceptability scale is a better and more consistent way (as compared to the more conventional 
individual endorsement scale) of measuring exclusionary content at the population level.  
To investigate whether the DMQ-A is a better guide for measuring exclusionary thinking 
amongst a population than the DMQ-E, the consistency and ability to predict intended behaviors 
and prejudicial attitudes are examined and compared. Additionally, a handful of supplemental 
measurements and items are included. Comparisons are made to evaluate if the DMQ items 
contribute anything to the prediction of these items that these other measurements don’t already 
explain.  
Comparators to the DMQ 
Ho et al.’s (2015) Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale, and Bizumic and Duckitt’s (2018) 
Very Short Authoritarianism (VSA) scale are included. These two measures are included as 
comparisons, as these are two dominant constructs in contemporary political psychology that are 
also important comparators to the Democidal Mindset, since they are found to predict prejudice-
related variables. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is the degree to which one supports 
group-based inequality (or hierarchies). Individual levels of SDO have been found to predict a 
range of intergroup attitudes and behaviors, including but not limited to, racism, sexism, 
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generalized prejudice against certain groups, support for torture, opposition towards humanitarian 
practices and affirmative action (Ho et al, 2015). The VSA scale is an adapted version of 
Altemeyer’s (1981) Right Wing Authoritarianism scale. Right-wing authoritarianism is the 
degree to which “people defer to established authorities, show aggression toward out-groups 
when authorities sanction that aggression, and support traditional values endorsed by authorities” 
(Saunders & Ngo, 2017, p. 1). Research has shown that individuals high in authoritarianism also 
express greater prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and are more supportive of tougher 
punitive authoritarian control (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018). Both the SDO and VSA are expected to 
positively correlate with the democidal thinking, for the Democidal Mindset covers content 
related to hierarchical thinking and prejudice to an out-group.  
Racial & Religious Prejudice Attitudes  
DeSante and Smith’s (2018) Fear, Institutionalized Racism, and Empathy (FIRE) scale is 
included. This scale is included as a useful tool to measure complex prejudicial attitudes (e.g., 
white guilt, acknowledgement of white privilege), while simultaneously capturing an affective 
component (i.e., fear, and empathy). While the FIRE scale was developed to measure racial 
attitudes in the United States (and it thus is used in its original format for the U.S. samples in this 
study), I have adapted it to be used in South Africa (the only tweak is that “U.S” is replaced with 
“South Africa”) and in India. In India, rather than measuring racial attitudes the scale is adapted 
to measure attitudes concerning religious prejudice. This was done after consulting with 
colleagues from India as well as from my own research and understanding of the context in India.  
See Appendix C for the three versions of the FIRE scale.  
Behavioral Intention Items 
The current study does not (and cannot) claim that the holding of democidal or 
exclusionary beliefs by citizens means that democidal behavior is likely to occur. More advanced 
 28 
studies would be needed before we are able to suggest that democidal thinking is related to actual 
democidal behavior. However, the current study does examine whether high levels of agreement 
or high levels of perceived acceptability are related to relevant intended behaviors.  
Three item sets are included to measure intended prejudicial behavior to specific groups. 
The general formatting of these items is loosely based on Bogardus’ (1933) widely used Social 
Distance Scale. Using the format of the Social Distance Scale, an individual indicates their 
willingness to participate in a social relationship or contract (which vary by degrees) with a 
person from a particular group. In the present study, participants indicate how willing they would 
be to accept a person from each of groups listed as their neighbor, a member of their family, or as 
the military leader or president of their country. For each of the three sampled countries, a set of 
groups were determined based on the relevant country context and historical background, making 
them country-specific. Alongside the country-specific groups, the same four additional groups 
were included across all three countries: homosexuals, transgender people, immigrants/migrants 
and foreigners. See Appendix D for the questions and list of groups. Due to the focus of the 
present study, these items are not analyzed in the same manner as Bogardus’ (1933) Social 
Distance Scale typically is (see Analysis section for more details).  
In addition to these, a set of eleven items are also included to measure intended behaviors 
that are theoretically relevant to democidal thinking. Seven of these items were loosely based on 
Stanton’s (2020) “10 Stages of Genocide”. For each stage, Stanton references behaviors that one 
might expect to see at each stage. For example, under his 6th stage, polarization, hate groups or 
extremists may broadcast polarizing propaganda, or laws may forbid certain forms of social 
interaction or relations between members. From this, items were designed to capture this content; 
e.g., “How likely would you be to vote in favor of a government policy that would forbid 
intermarriage between certain ethnic groups?”. And finally, an additional two to four items 
(depending on the country) were included from Claassen (2017) that asked participants how 
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likely they were to take action to prevent a certain group from (1) moving into their neighborhood 
and (2) operating a business in their area. See Appendix E. 
Research Questions 
This study aims to answer two primary research questions: (1) whether the acceptability 
scale (DMQ-A), is a better guide for measuring a country’s level of democidal thinking, as 
compared to the endorsement scale (DMQ-E); (2) is there evidence of pluralistic ignorance taking 
place? 
 
Research Question # 1. The first research question was broken into a subset of five questions: 
§ RQ1a: Are there agreed upon normative beliefs related to democide, and which 
measure produced more agreement?  To answer this question, we examined the 
degree to which individuals who completed the DMQ-A agreed on their responses 
and compared that to the degree to which individuals who completed the DMQ-E 
agreed on their responses. 
§ RQ1b: Which measure (DMQ-A vs. DMQ-E) was less affected by demographic 
groups? In other words, do the results for the DMQ-A indicate that they are not due 
to demographic subgroups, but instead pertain to the entire population? 
§ RQ1c Which measure (DMQ-A vs. DMQ-E) was more consistent across the 
Democidal Mindset themes? Said another way, which measure produced a response-
pattern that was more replicable across cultures in terms of the eleven DMQ themes? 
§ RQ1d: Do perceived democidal norms (DMQ-A) affect intended behavior, and how 
does this compare to the effects of personal democidal beliefs (DMQ-E) on intended 
behavior?  
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§ RQ1e: Do perceived democidal norms (DMQ-A) affect related prejudicial attitudes 
(FIRE scale)), and how does this compare to the effects of personal democidal beliefs 
(DMQ-E) on prejudicial attitudes? 
Research Question # 2. Is there evidence of pluralistic ignorance? Evidence of pluralistic 
ignorance would come from people rating pro-democidal views as more acceptable in their 
country than are actually endorsed, or conversely from people rating anti-democidal views as 
more condemned or deviant even though most people in their country subscribe to them.  
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II. METHODS 
Participants & Recruitment 
Participants were recruited from three countries: The United States, India and South Africa. 
Participants in the United States and India were recruited using Mechanical Turk. Participants in 
South Africa were recruited using a Qualtrics panel, as Mechanical Turk (MTurk) did not have 
enough South African workers signed up on their platform (MTurk was only introduced to the 
country in 2017). In all three samples participants had to be 18 years old or older and proficient in 
the English language. Due to the differing platforms and their respective fees and rates, Mturk 
workers were compensated $4 for their time, and Qualtrics respondents were compensated $6.50. 
Below are the demographics for each sample: 
India Samples. For the DMQ-E sample (N=105), participants were 74% male, 
MAge=29.21, 75% Hindu, and 94% reported having a bachelor’s degree. Participants in the DMQ-
A sample (N=100) were 69% male, MAge=28.5, 83% Hindu, and 89% reported having a 
bachelor’s degree.  
U.S. Samples. For the DMQ-E sample (N=104), participants were 62% male, 
MAge=38.12, 76% white/Caucasian, and 57% reported having a bachelor’s degree. Participants in 
the DMQ-A sample (N=100) were 56% male, MAge=38.87, 74% white/Caucasian, and 52% 
reported having a bachelor’s degree.  
South Africa Samples. The demographic breakdown for age, sex, and race were agreed 
upon in advanced with Qualtrics. For the DMQ-E sample (N=104), participants were 53% 
female, MAge=42.31, relatively well balanced with regard to race (42% Black African, 43% 
white/Caucasian, 6% Colored, and 9% Indian/Asian), and relatively evenly distributed across 
education levels (69% of people had some form of postsecondary education). Participants in the 
DMQ-A sample (N=110) were 50% male, MAge=45.17, relatively well balanced with regard to 
race (41% Black African, 44% white/Caucasian, 10% Colored, and 5% Indian/Asian), and 
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relatively evenly distributed across education levels (65% of people had some form of 
postsecondary education).  
Materials 
Democidal Mindset. To measure the Democidal Mindset, all participants received the 
complete set of items from Democidal Mindset Questionnaire (DMQ) along with the additional 
add-on theme that covered in-group blamelessness (Landau et al., 2020). In total, there were 63 
DMQ items. What differed between surveys was the response scale that was used. Within each 
country, and with independent samples, ~100 participants were given a regular 
agreement/disagreement scale and ~100 participants were given the newly developed 
acceptability scale. The measures and scales are as follows: 
● Democidal Mindset Questionnaire - Endorsement (DMQ-E). Using this scale participants 
were asked to rate their own agreement (or disagreement) with the Democidal Mindset 
items, on a scale of 0-4: 0 being “definitely disagree” and 4 being “definitely agree”. See 
Appendix F for the response scale.  
● Democidal Mindset Questionnaire - Acceptability (DMQ-A). Using this scale participants 
were asked to rate their perceived acceptability of these items in their country, on a scale 
of 0-4, “condemned” being 0 and 4 being “praised and commended”. See Appendix F for 
the response scale.  
Authoritarianism. Bizumic and Duckitt’s (2018) 6-item Very Short Authoritarianism 
(VSA) scale was used to measure authoritarianism. The abbreviated scale was developed directly 
from Altemeyer’s (1998) widely used Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Similar to the 
Democidal Mindset scales, participants were either asked to rate their own agreement or their 
perceived societal acceptability of the 6 items.  
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Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). To measure SDO, the revised 8-item SDO scale 
developed by Ho et al. (2015). Once again, participants were either asked to rate their own 
agreement or their perceived acceptability of the 8 items.  
Fear, Institutional Racism and Empathy (FIRE). DeSante and Smith’s (2018) FIRE 
scale was used and adapted to assess various types of racism or prejudice on a scale of 1-5, with 1 
being “strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree”. As the FIRE scale was developed 
specifically to measure racial attitudes in the U.S., the original scale was utilized for the U.S. 
samples. For the South Africa samples, the only alteration to the scale was substituting the word 
“U.S.” with “South Africa”. For the India sample, the scale was adapted to measure for attitudes 
of religious prejudice, rather than racism. See Appendix C.  
Behavioral intention measures. A number of behavioral intention items were included to 
compare how participants’ perceptions of acceptability or actual endorsement of democidal 
beliefs are related to certain discriminatory behaviors. See Appendix D and Appendix E. 
Demographic materials:   
• Participants were asked to report their sex, age, ethnicity (in the U.S.), religion 
(in India), race (in South Africa), and ethnic/religious/racial identification (which 
ranged from “very little” to “very much” on a 4-point Likert-scale).  
• Political affiliation. Participants were asked to report their political affiliation 
using a 5-point Likert-scale that ranged from “very conservative/very right-wing” 
to “very liberal/left-wing”.  
• Subjective SES. In order to measure socioeconomic status (SES) in three 
different cultures, Adler’s et al. (2000) measure of subjective socioeconomic 
status was utilized. Participants were presented with an image of a ladder in 
which the rungs/steps were labeled 1-10 (1 being the highest rung, and 10 being 
the lowest). They were told that people at the top of the ladder are the people 
who are the best off – those who have the most money, the most education and 
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the most respected jobs. And on the bottom of the ladder are the people who are 
the worst off. Participants were then asked to select the number that 
corresponded with the rung/step where they thought they stood relative to other 
people in their country. 
Procedures 
MTurk Samples  
For both India and the United States, participants were recruited via MTurk. To sign up 
on MTurk, all individuals are required to be over the age of 18 and be proficient in English. Using 
the additional qualification settings, I was able to ensure that the surveys were available only to 
participants located in India or the United States. In addition, I also set up an additional 
qualification to not allow repeat submissions (participants were only able to take the survey 
once). Samples were collected in batches of 9 participants (in order to avoid paying a higher 
MTurk fee) and released at staggered time intervals throughout the day (morning, afternoon and 
evening) within each of the respective time zones in an attempt to reach a wider range of people 
(e.g., not only the earlier risers, or people who didn’t work a typical Monday - Friday job). 
Eligible participants completed the online questionnaire—which was programmed in Qualtrics. 
For each country, the aim was to obtain around 100 participants to take the DMQ-E measure, and 
100 participants to take the DMQ-A. Prior to accepting the submissions, the data was reviewed 
for poor quality work. Participant’s work was rejected if (a) they did not fully complete the 
survey, (b) they did not pass the attention check (a simple item that instructed participants to 
select a specific option), (c) had a duration of less than five minutes, which was typically a ¼ (or 
less) of the mean response time, making it a workable and lenient threshold, and (d) they were 
identified as “same-responders”. For criterion c, “same-responders” were defined as participants 
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who used the same response (e.g., strongly agree) for 90% or more of the items. After poor 
quality work was rejected, this required reposting the survey for additional participants to submit.  
Qualtrics Panel Samples  
South African participants were recruited via a Qualtrics panel. Qualtrics ensured that 
participants would speak English, and that 50% of the sample would be male and 50% female. In 
addition, they also were able to ensure that the samples were well balanced according to age 
(~33% were between the ages of 18-34, ~33% between the ages of 35-55, and the final ~33% 
were 55+). For these reasons, the South African samples are more balanced across demographic 
groups. Similar to the MTurk samples, before submissions were accepted, the data was reviewed 
for poor quality work (e.g., having a duration of less than five minutes or being identified as a 
“same-responder”).  Qualtrics was able to automatically reject participants who did not complete 
the survey and who failed to pass the attention check.  
Analysis 
First, reverse-keyed items for all scales (e.g., DMQ, SDO, behavioral scales) were flipped so that 
items were coded in the same direction; this was done for each of the samples. Second, in order to 
more efficiently use the measurements in analyses, variables were computed to reflect the overall 
DMQ-E or DMQ-A scores, by averaging or aggregating across DMQ items for each participant. 
This was also done for the VSA, SDO, and FIRE scales as well. In addition, DMQ theme 
variables were also created by averaging across the specific items that coincided with each of the 
eleven themes (as determined by Landau et al., 2020) for each participant.  
Since different statistical tools were used for each of the research questions, the analysis 
plan for each question was as follows: 
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RQ1a: Are there agreed upon normative beliefs related to democide, and which measure 
produced more agreement?   
To assess if the DMQ-A is a more reliable measure to use, reliability analyses were 
conducted, and psychometric qualities assessed. Rather than examining the reliability analyses of 
items (which were also run as a supplemental analysis, see Table 1), reliability analyses of raters 
are investigated here. While inter-item reliability analyses are particular useful for assessing the 
items themselves and making decisions about which items to retain and which to discard (which 
was investigated by Landau et al, 2020), the focus of the present study was to assess which 
measure produced better reliability (i.e., higher convergence) amongst raters. Better reliability 
amongst raters would suggest that there is more agreement or consensus in their ratings, and in 
turn should suggest that the measure/scale in question produces more homogeneity, i.e., more 
consistent estimates of the underlying phenomenon. 
 In order to run inter-rater reliability analyses, the data for the 63 DMQ items was 
transposed, so that each participant was made to be a variable, and each of the DMQ items treated 
as a row of data. After examining the reliability coefficients, an odd finding emerged for one of 
the samples. In India, the DMQ-A sample displayed weak psychometric qualities signaling 
something problematic with the data in this particular sample and required further investigation. 
The association between participants’ scores was reviewed via a correlation matrix on the 
transposed data (in which items were rows of data and participants were variables, n=100), and it 
was decided that the set of participants needed refinement to improve reliability. In order to do 
this, principal components analyses (PCA) were run and extraction communalities for the first 
two components were assessed. To improve this sample, only participants with high extraction-
communalities values were retained, as this would suggest that their responses were relatively 
well explained by the components. In order to determine a cut-off value for the extraction 
communalities, a histogram was reviewed, and the value of .135 was chosen. All participants with 
an extraction value of .135 or higher were retained and all others removed, thus creating a smaller 
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and refined version of the sample (n=32) consisting of a set of respondents more comparable with 
other samples in their within-country convergence. The original DMQ-A sample and this newly 
refined DMQ-A sample in India are used in the results section to allow for comparisons between 
the two. Greater detail regarding the steps taken here to obtain this refined sample can be found in 
the results section. 
To compare the reliability and consistency between the two measures, standard 
deviations, coefficients of internal consistency, and unidimensionality between raters were 
assessed. The normality of the distributions was also evaluated by comparing the levels of 
skewness and kurtosis in raters’ responses.  
 
RQ1b: Which measure (DMQ-A vs. DMQ-E) was less affected by demographic groups? 
In order to explore whether the DMQ-A was a more consistent measure across 
demographic subgroups (i.e., if it suggests that the results are not due to subgroups but instead 
pertain to the entire population), a combination of means, standard deviations, correlations (zero-
order and point-biserial) and partial eta squared scores were examined. The purpose was to see if 
any of the demographic variables were systematically related to either the DMQ-E or the DMQ-
A. Participants average score for the 63 DMQ items was calculated for both the DMQ-E and 
DMQ-A scales and used in the analyses that follow. In addition, to more thoroughly investigate 
certain key demographic variables (e.g., religion, ethnicity, political affiliation) dummy codes 
were also created. Dummy codes were generated based on rationale first (i.e., is there a good 
reason to compare subgroups?), and second if there was a sufficient number of participants in 
each of the said subgroups (i.e., at least 20 or more). Point-biserial correlations and effect sizes of 
these dummy-coded variables were run when needed and examined. As the present study 
examines three different countries, demographics factors differed sometimes depending on the 
country. For example, in India, participants were asked what their religion was, while in the 
 38 
United States participants were asked what their ethnicity was, and in South Africa, what their 
race was.  
 
RQ1c Which measure (DMQ-A vs. DMQ-E) was more consistent across the Democidal Mindset 
themes?  
To determine if the DMQ-A (compared to the DMQ-E) means for each of the eleven 
DMQ themes (see Appendix A) were more consistent across countries, means and correlations 
between samples are examined. Two steps of analysis were taken. First, participants average 
scores for each of the eleven themes were computed. Descriptive statistics were then run to obtain 
overall means and standard deviations for each of the themes in each of the samples. General 
comparisons of means and standard deviations were made first. Themes with the highest means 
across countries as well as those with the lowest means across countries were also identified.   
Second, using the descriptive data generated in the first step, a new dataset was created and zero-
order correlations between samples were run. Whichever set of samples (DMQ-E samples vs. 
DMQ-A samples) shows the stronger correlations, would be the measure that is more consistent 
across countries in terms of the eleven DMQ themes.  
 
RQ1d: Do perceived democidal norms (DMQ-A) affect intended behavior, and how does this 
compare to the effects of personal democidal beliefs (DMQ-E) on intended behavior?  
This research question asked two related questions: first, which measure does a better job 
at predicting behavioral intention items after controlling for demographic factors; and secondly, 
do the measures add anything unique to the predictability of behavioral intention items that 
cannot otherwise be explained by the VSA and SDO variables (i.e., do they produce significant 
findings after controlling for the VSA and SDO variables). To answer these questions, a series of 
hierarchical regressions were run. As listed previously, there were two sets of behavioral 
intention items, the “social distance” items and the remaining set of items that were crafted 
 39 
particularly for this study. The three social distance questions asked participants how likely they 
would be to accept a person from one of the given social groups (of which there ranged between 8 
- 11 groups depending on the country) as a specific social relation or contact (e.g., (1) neighbor, 
(2) family member, and (3) leader). It should be noted that these social distance items are only 
loosely based on Bogardus’ (1933) Social Distance Scale (SDS) with regard to their formatting, 
and not in terms of how they are analyzed. The SDS is a rank-order (or hierarchical) scale and as 
such, is treated as a Guttman Scale, or a cumulative scale. With a Guttman Scale, agreement with 
one item implies agreement with the items that preceded it. For instance, if one agrees that they 
would accept an immigrant as a close relative by marriage, the SDS assumes you would also 
accept an immigrant as your neighbor or your close personal friend. Unfortunately, the Guttman 
scale has its drawbacks (Clogg & Sawyer, 1981; Mather et al, 2017) and has been criticized for 
oversimplifying attitudes towards others and our willingness to participant in a social relation 
with others. For example, one might feel more strongly towards who their co-workers are than 
who their neighbors are, rather than the other way around as the SDS suggests. Another example 
could be that, in a certain culture, it might be relatively common to have a member from a certain 
group as a close relative by marriage, so one may not feel as strongly towards them in that social 
relation but might feel very strongly about having them a close friend. In addition, the SDS and 
the Guttman Scale is unidimensional in nature, and so does not pick up on the varying degrees of 
a person’s attitude towards a group in a particular social relation. In the present study, a 5-point 
Likert scale is used to measure participants attitudes towards specific groups in certain social 
relations. And rather than aggregating the scores across the three social relations used here 
(neighbor, family member and leader), these items are treated separately in order to distinguish 
any subtle differences between the three levels of social relations and how democidal thinking 
predicts intended behavior towards specific social groups.  
In the present study, hierarchical regressions are used to assess the predictive power of 
the DMQ-E and the DMQ-A on behavioral intention items. For the social distance items, 
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hierarchical regressions were run separately for each of the social groups within each of the three 
questions. Behavioral items were treated as the dependent variable. Likewise, hierarchical 
regressions were also run for the remaining behavioral intention items (ranging between nine and 
eleven depending on country). For both types of behavioral items, two stages of analysis were 
completed. In the first stage, hierarchical regressions were run by including demographics 
variables in step 1 (i.e., model 1), and then including either the DMQ-E themes or the DMQ-A 
themes in step 2 (i.e., model 2). After this was completed, another set of hierarchical regressions 
were run, but this time with an extra model included. Once again, demographics were included in 
step 1, but in step 2, both VSA and SDO variables (i.e., participants overall score on these 
measures) were included, and finally, either the DMQ-E themes or the DMQ-A themes were 
included in step 3.  
R-squared values were examined to determine how much of the variance could be 
explained by either the DMQ-E or the DMQ-A themes. Comparisons were then made across 
measures and across countries.  
 
RQ1e: Do perceived democidal norms (DMQ-A) affect related prejudicial attitudes (FIRE 
scale)), and how does this compare to the effects of personal democidal beliefs (DMQ-E) on 
prejudicial attitudes? 
Similar to the previous research question, a series of hierarchical regression analyses 
were run to investigate which measure—the DMQ-E or the DMQ-A—did a better job at 
predicting prejudicial attitudes after demographic variables were added. In addition, hierarchical 
regression analyses were also run to determine if either measure explained any of the variance in 
prejudicial attitudes that was not explained by the VSA and SDO variables. Prejudicial attitudes 
were measured using four-item FIRE scale. In the first stage, hierarchical regressions were run 
with the overall FIRE scores (i.e., participants average scores on this measure) as the dependent 
variable, demographics variables in step 1 (i.e., model 1), and either the DMQ-E themes or the 
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DMQ-A themes in step 2 (i.e., model 2). For the second set of hierarchical regressions, once 
again, the overall FIRE scores variable was treated as the dependent variable, demographics were 
included in step 1, both VSA and SDO variables (i.e., participants overall score on these 
measures) were included in step 2, and either the DMQ-E themes or the DMQ-A themes included 
in step 3. R-squared values were then examined to determine how much of the variance in the 
FIRE scores could be explained by either the DMQ-E or the DMQ-A themes. Comparisons were 
then made across measures and across countries.  
 
RQ2. Is there evidence of pluralistic ignorance?  
Pluralistic ignorance was assessed in two primary ways. First mean differences (between 
measures) of the 11 Democidal Mindset themes were obtained through simple subtraction and 
analyzed. Secondly, linear regressions were run and examined along with the saved residuals. 
Zero-order correlations were also reviewed. To run these analyses, a new dataset was compiled. 
Using the transposed dataset that was also utilized in RQ1a (i.e., the inter-rater reliability 
analyses), the inter-rater means for the 63 DMQ items were extracted and moved into a new 
dataset. This was done for each of the seven samples (India DMQ-E, India DMQ-A, India refined 
DMQ-A, U.S DMQ-E, U.S. DMQ-A, South Africa DMQ-E, and South Africa DMQ-A). The 
data used here (from the transposed dataset) were all coded in the same direction (i.e., all opposite 
content items had been reversed prior to transposing). Although this new dataset allowed for 
direct comparisons to be made between the two measures, analyses should be interpreted with a 
note of caution. Participants who received the DMQ-E measure were in independent samples with 
different response scales (which were differently anchored, see Appendix F for the scales), from 
participants who received the DMQ-A, making comparisons between samples complicated. Any 
differences in the results could simply be an artifact of the difference in response scales, and thus, 
the analyses that follow are more exploratory in nature. It does help comparability, however, that 
both DMQ-E and DMQ-A used 0-to-4 response scales. 
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To examine which of the eleven Democidal Mindset themes were most affected by the 
measure, differences between the theme means are calculated first within countries, and then 
across countries. The degree to which the two measures differ in respect to theme means within 
and between countries, could give insight into which themes generate the largest disagreement in 
terms of perceived acceptability and personal endorsement. Furthermore, differences in theme 
means might suggest evidence of pluralistic ignorance occurring—i.e., the degree to which 
participants agree with (or disagree with) certain themes, is different to how participants perceive 
the acceptability of these themes in their country 
Zero-order correlations between the DMQ-E and the DMQ-A samples within each 
country were computed to examine the strength of the association between these measures. If the 
correlations are close to perfect that might suggest that there isn’t a difference between the levels 
of personal endorsement and the levels of perceived acceptability of the DMQ items in a country, 
and therefore, that pluralistic ignorance is likely not occurring. However, correlations that are less 
than perfect might suggest that people really are misperceiving how accepted (or unaccepted) 
these items are in their country (using the actual levels of endorsement as the base). Linear 
regressions were also conducted, where the inter-rater item means of acceptability (i.e., DMQ-A, 
the independent variable) were used to predict inter-rater item means of endorsement (i.e., DMQ-
E, the dependent variable). This was completed for each country. From these regressions one 
could assess the proportion of variance that the DMQ-A scores explained in the DMQ-E scores. 
Similar to the correlations, if the DMQ-A is not able to explain a certain portion of the variance in 
the DMQ-E, this might suggest that pluralistic ignorance is at play. And finally, the 
unstandardized residuals were also saved from the regression analyses. The residuals allow one to 
see how far off a data point is from the regression line of best fit, with larger residuals indicating 
more divergence between the independent and dependent variables.  In the context of this dataset, 
the larger residuals signaled which DMQ items displayed the greatest discrepancy between the 
DMQ-A and the DMQ-E. To assess which items generated the largest residuals on average across 
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countries, the average of the residuals was computed. To calculate this average, alongside the 
residuals from the U.S. and South Africa, the India residuals that were obtained using the refined 
DMQ-A sample (and not the residuals that used the regular DMQ-A sample) were used; the 
refined sample was used as it was deemed (from the previous analyses conducted) to be a more 
reliable sample for the DMQ-A in India (the refined DMQ-A was also more comparable to the 
other countries in its degree of inter-rater convergence). Average residuals greater than .20 or less 
that -.20 were identified and interpreted. Once again, such results might point towards a potential 




RQ1a: Are there agreed upon normative beliefs related to democide, and which measure 
produced more agreement?   
Inter-rater reliability analyses were conducted on the transposed data, and psychometric 
qualities assessed for each measure. While not discussed here, the inter-item reliability analyses 
for the DMQ, VSA, and SDO in each sample were also run as supplemental analyses (see tables 
in Appendix G for the results). Overall, in terms of inter-rater reliability, the alpha values for both 
the DMQ-E and the DMQ-A were relatively similar and high (all above .90) across all samples 
(see Table 1). As mentioned in the analysis section, the one exception to this was the DMQ-A 
sample in India, which had much lower internal consistency (α=.71) between raters and also a 
very low mean of inter-rater correlations and intraclass correlation (single measures).  
Table 1.         
Psychometric Qualities for Raters Across Full Set of DMQ 
items   



















Cronbach alpha      .970 .710 .861 .920 .940 .980 .960 
Stdzd. Cronbach Alpha .970 .610 .864 .910 .950 .980 .960 
Mean of inter-rater correlations 
[MIC] 
.250 .020 .166 .090 .150 .280 .180 
Intraclass correlation (ICC) 
single measures 
.220 .020 .162 .090 .130 .280 .180 
Variance of inter-rater 
correlations (VIC) 
.040 .020 .036 .050 .040 .030 .030 
Variance of the rater means 
(VIM) 
.310 .260 .226 1.190 .610 .310 .320 
Mean of DMQ item std. 
deviation 
1.100 .840 1.100 1.020 .950 .950 1.200 
Note. The data was transposed so that participants were variables (i.e., raters) and DMQ items were each a row of data. 
The last row here, “Mean of DMQ item standard deviations” reflects how much the raters were giving the same raw 
response, one indicator of convergence. 
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To further investigate the reason for the weak psychometric qualities in India DMQ-A 
sample, the correlation matrix was reviewed and the association between participant’s scores 
assessed—this was also done by using a transposed dataset in which participants were variables, 
and DMQ items were rows. From this matrix it became apparent that most participants’ responses 
were not strongly correlated with one another. This is unusual, as one would expect to see some 
degree of convergence in non-random data for almost any measurement (and especially for this 
measure of perceived acceptability). However, the correlation matrix did show a smaller 
subgroup of participants that were more appropriately correlated with one another. In order to 
reduce the data (i.e., the participants) and hopefully improve this sample, a principal components 
analysis (PCA) on all 100 participant variables was run. A five-factor model was arbitrarily 
selected, while a quartimax rotation was intentionally used (as this rotation tends to keep much of 
the first unrotated component in place, which is what one would want when identifying 
convergences). From the scree plot that was produced, it was evident that there were only two 
factors, so another PCA was run, but this time specifying only 2 components or factors. From the 
results, the extraction communalities were examined. These extraction values suggest how much 
variance within each of the variables can be explained by the principal components. Variables 
with high values are well represented, while variables with low values are not well represented. 
To improve this sample, to make it more comparable to the other samples, I sought to retain those 
Table 2.  


















Mean 3.690 3.910 3.500 2.890 3.010 2.840 3.030 
Standard Deviation .540 .160 .490 .340 .360 .760 .520 
Skewness -2.310 -.590 -1.080 1.320 .420 .080 -.180 
Kurtosis 5.160 -.010 .996 3.310 .780 -.690 -.560 
Note. The data was transposed so that participants were variables (i.e., raters) and DMQ items were each a 




participants with high values, as this would suggest that their responses were relatively well 
explained by the components. In order to visualize the distribution of the extraction values, and 
thereby create a cut-off value, a histogram was generated. This histogram gave evidence that 
many of the participants were grouped together with low extraction communalities. Using the 
threshold of .135 (chosen based on the histogram), I retained all participants with an extraction 
value of .135 or higher. After all other participants were removed, a considerably smaller, but 
more reliable, sample remained (n=32). This refined sample2 is included in all analyses alongside 
the original Indian DMQ-A to show how it might correct for some of the unusual findings in the 
original sample.  
Across all three countries, the unidimensionality of raters in both DMQ-E and DMQ-A 
scales were unsatisfactory (i.e., greater than .01); the variance of inter-rater correlations (VIC) 
values were all between .02 - .05 (see Table 1). However, in both India and the U.S. the DMQ-A 
samples (including the refined sample in India) showed better unidimensionality of raters than the 
DMQ-E samples. In South Africa, unidimensionality was the same for both DMQ-E and DMQ-A 
samples.  
In India (both original and refined) and the U.S., the distributions (of rater responses) for 
the DMQ-A samples appeared to be more normally distributed than the DMQ-E samples. These 
samples showed much less peakedness and skew than their DMQ-E counterparts (see Table 2). In 
addition, the average standard deviation for the raters were also lower for the DMQ-A samples 
than it was for the DMQ-E samples, suggesting that there was more convergence in these 
samples. While the refined DMQ-A sample in India was also more normally distributed than the 
Indian DMQ-E sample, it had the same average standard deviation for raters (SD=1.1; See Table 
2). In South Africa both the DMQ-E and DMQ-A samples were normally distributed, with very 
little skew or peakedness (see Table 2). However, unlike India and the U.S., the DMQ-E in South 
 
2 In the refined DMQ-A sample participants were 75% male, MAge=28.22, 81% Hindu, and 81% reported 
having a bachelor’s degree. 
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Africa reported a lower average standard deviation for raters compared to the DMQ-A (see Table 
2).   
 
RQ1b: Which measure (DMQ-A vs. DMQ-E) was less affected by demographic groups? 
Total means for participant DMQ scores suggests that for the most part, the DMQ-A 
generated higher means and lower average standard deviations (with a couple of exceptions) (see 
Table 3). The two exceptions to this are that in India, the refined DMQ-A sample had a slightly 
Table 3.       
Descriptive Statistics for Measures 
  N M SD Skew Kurt. 
US DMQ-E DMQ 104 2.892 1.089 -.064 -1.456 
 FIRE 104 3.579 1.012 .028 -.893 
 VSA 104 2.633 .919 -.112 -.705 
 SDO 104 2.513 1.031 -.201 -1.242 
US DMQ-A DMQ 100 3.011 .780 .298 -.874 
 FIRE 100 3.698 .900 .116 -1.209 
 VSA 100 2.925 .464 -.070 .884 
 SDO 100 2.538 .639 -.200 -.039 
IN DMQ-E DMQ 105 3.693 .556 -.998 1.206 
 FIRE 105 2.824 .494 -.864 1.003 
 VSA 105 3.289 .539 .505 .881 
 SDO 105 2.725 .653 -1.260 .729 
IN DMQ-A DMQ 100 3.897 .525 .042 -.158 
FIRE 100 2.863 .427 -.559 1.792 
VSA 100 3.888 .611 .092 -.411 
SDO 100 3.865 .624 -.184 .164 
IN DMQ-A 
Refined 
DMQ 32 3.650 .540 .617 .683 
FIRE 32 2.750 .575 -.271 .676 
VSA 32 3.740 .617 .653 .169 
SDO 32 3.612 .635 .047 .080 
SA DMQ-E DMQ 104 2.844 .560 .331 .376 
 FIRE 104 2.123 .678 .136 -.878 
 VSA 104 3.657 .792 -.555 .529 
 SDO 104 2.142 .610 .160 -.537 
SA DMQ-A DMQ 110 3.030 .565 1.243 4.595 
 FIRE 110 2.161 .619 .243 -.521 
 VSA 110 3.426 .706 .249 -.068 
 SDO 110 2.403 .685 .801 1.818 
Notes. N - numbers of participants. M - mean. SD - standard deviation. Kurt.- kurtosis. IN - India. US - 
United States. SA - South Africa. DMQ - participant means scores on Democidal Mindset items. FIRE - 
participant means scores on Fear, Institutionalized Racism and Empathy scale. VSA - participant means 
scores on Very Short Authoritarianism Scale. SDO - participant means scores on Social Dominance 
Orientation.   
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lower mean (M=3.53) than the DMQ-E (M=3.69), and in South Africa, the DMQ-A reported an 
almost equal, but slightly higher standard deviation (SD=.57) than the DMQ-E (SD=.56) (see 
Table 3). When comparing the means across the two measures, it suggests that participants 
reported higher levels of acceptability than the levels of actual endorsement that were reported. In 
addition, the lower standard deviations on the DMQ-A measure suggest that participants’ scores 
of acceptability were closer together than participants’ scores of endorsements; that is, they  
agreed more regarding what is acceptable than regarding what each personally agreed with. 
 Furthermore, correlations and effect sizes appear to suggest that the DMQ-A was also 
less influenced by and more consistent across demographics than the DMQ-E. While this finding 
was most apparent in South Africa, it was also true to an extent in the U.S. and in India. As 
mentioned in the analysis section, to measure for the democidal items, participant total means 
scores (aggregated across the 63 DMQ items) for the DMQ-E and DMQ-A are utilized here. In 
Table 4.           
Zero-Order Correlations Between Demographics and S. Africa DMQ-E and DMQ-A 
  DMQ-E   DMQ-A 
  r Sig.   r Sig. 
DMQ x Sex  .213 .096   .062 .523 
DMQ x Age   -.208* .034   .074 .444 
DMQ x Racial Identification .019 .848   -.026 .789 
DMQ x Political Affiliation .291* .003   .155 .105 
DMQ x Education -.188 .056   -.191* .046 
DMQ x Sub. SES .204* .038   .244* .010 
DMQ x Race Dummy (black vs. other) .269** .006   .106 .270 
DMQ x Race Dummy (white vs. other) -.301** .002   -.164 .087 
DMQ x Education Dummy (low vs. high) .258** .008   -.015 .880 
DMQ x Polit. Affil. Dummy (conser. vs. other) .174 .077   .066 .495 
DMQ x Polit. Affil. Dummy (liberal. vs. other) -.200* .042   -.118 .220 
DMQ x Sub. SES Dummy (low vs. high) .123 .212   .171 .074 
DMQ x Race .310 .017   .221 .149 
Notes. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. The correlations reported for race in both samples are Eta 
coefficients. In the DMQ-E sample, since participants reported being either male (code as “1”), female 
(coded as “2), or as “other” (coded as 3), sex is also reported here as an Eta coefficient. In the DMQ-A 
sample, sex was dichotomous, as participants only reported as male (coded as “1”) and female (coded as “2”). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).       
 49 
South Africa, many of the demographic variables were associated with the DMQ-E: age, political 
affiliation (very left-wing/liberal to very right-wing/conservative), subjective SES, race, both 
dummy-coded versions of race, the dummy-code version of education, and one the dummy-coded 
versions of political affiliation (which compared those who reported as “very liberal” to all 
others; see Table 4). In contrast, only education and subjective SES were significantly correlated 
with the DMQ-A (see Table 4) illustrating that it was less affected by demographic factors.  
In the U.S., political affiliation, education, and the two dummy-coded versions of 
political affiliation (one that compared those reporting as “very liberal” to all others, and another 
comparing those reporting as “very conservative: to all others) produce significant findings for 
both the DMQ-E and the DMQ-A (see Table 5). Although the same demographic variables were 
predictive of both measures in the U.S., they correlated much more strongly with the DMQ-E 
than they did with the DMQ-A (see Table 5). For instance, political affiliation was moderately 
correlated with the DMQ-E (r=.58, p<.001; see Table 5), but only weakly correlated with the 
DMQ-A (r=.32, p<.001; see Table 5). The same was true for the dummy-coded versions of 
political affiliation (see Table 5).  
Table 5.           
Zero-Order and Point Biserial Correlations Between Demographics and U.S. DMQ-E and DMQ-A 
    DMQ-E     DMQ-A 
  r Sig. r Sig. 
DMQ x Sex .048 .626 -.124 .223 
DMQ x Age -.049 .624 -.058 .571 
DMQ x Ethnic Identification .104 .295 .058 .566 
DMQ x Political Affiliation .576** .000 .315** .001 
DMQ x Education .314** .001 .260** .009 
DMQ x Sub. SES .100 .312 .163 .107 
DMQ x Ethnic Dummy (white vs. other) .039 .693 -.163 .107 
DMQ x Ethnic ID Dummy (low vs. high) .074 .455 .074 .464 
DMQ x Polit. Affil. Dummy (Liberal vs. other) -.525** .000 -.275** .006 
DMQ x Polit. Affil. Dummy (Conser. vs. other) .525** .000 .266** .008 
DMQ x Ethnicity   .297 .056 .241 .224 
Notes. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. The correlations reported for ethnicity are Eta 
coefficients. Sex was dichotomous, as participants only reported as male (coded as “1”) and female 
(coded as “2”). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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In India, sex, age and religious identification (i.e., how much an individual identifies with 
their reported religion, ranging from very little to very much) were all significantly correlated 
with the DMQ-E (rSex=.35 p<.001; rAge=-.33, p<.001; rReliID=-.20, p=.04; see Table 6). In the full 
DMQ-A sample in India only the dummy-coded version of subjective SES (comparing those low 
on SES, 1-6, to those high on SES, 7-10) reported a weak but significant point-biserial correlation 
with the DMQ-A (rpb=.25, p<.05; see Table 7). There was also a significant effect size of religion 
(η2=.31, p<.008; see Table 7). However, when the refined DMQ-A sample was used, there were 
no significant findings across any of the demographics (see Table 7), which might suggest that 











Table 6.   
Zero-Order and Point Biserial Correlations Between Demographics and India DMQ-E 
 r Sig. 
DMQ x Sex .349** .000 
DMQ x Age -.325** .000 
DMQ x Religious Identification .203* .038 
DMQ x Political Affiliation .146 .138 
DMQ x Education .085 .386 
DMQ x Sub. SES .085 .391 
DMQ x Religion Dummy (Hindu vs. other) .015 .883 
DMQ x Religion Dummy (Christian vs. other) .015 .878 
DMQ x Polit. Affil. Dummy (conser. vs. liberal) .138 .160 
DMQ x Religion .140 .735 
Notes. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. The correlation reported for religion is an Eta coefficient. Sex 
was dichotomous, as participants only reported as male (coded as “1”) and female (coded as “2”). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
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RQ1c Which measure (DMQ-A vs. DMQ-E) was more consistent across the Democidal 
Mindset themes? 
Generally speaking, across countries, the average theme mean was higher for the DMQ-A 
measure than it was for the DMQ-E (see Table 8 and Figure 2).  The average theme mean was 
highest in the India samples (MDMQ-E=3.66, SDDMQ-E=.73; MDMQ-A=3.90, SDDMQ-A=.66; MDMQ-
A_R=3.56, SDDMQ-A_R=.68) as compared to the United States (MDMQ-E=2.88, SDDMQ-E=.1.18, and 
MDMQ-A=3.02, SDDMQ-A=.87) and South Africa (MDMQ-E=2.84, SDDMQ-E=.83 and MDMQ-A=3.03, 
SDDMQ-A=.79) (see Table 8 and Figure 2). The average standard deviations for themes were lower 
for the DMQ-A samples than they were for the DMQ-E samples (see Table 8). This may suggest 
that there is less variability in how people respond to the items within each theme on the DMQ-A 
than for the DMQ-E. Figure 3 shows a few interesting findings. Firstly, as stated above, India had 
some of the highest means (this could be in part due to acquiescence in these samples which is 
discussed later on) (See Figure 3). Secondly, the DMQ-E (i.e., personal endorsements) sample in 
South Africa displayed marked spread or splay amongst theme means that is not seen in other 
samples (See Figure 3). This could suggest that there was greater diversity or more variability in  
Table 7.      
Zero-Order and Point Biserial Correlations Between Demographics and India DMQ-A and DMQ-A 
Refined  
 India DMQ-A  India Refined DMQ-A 
 r Sig.  r Sig. 
DMQ x Sex .065 .522  .325 .070 
DMQ x Age -.037 .715  -.276 .126 
DMQ x Religious Identification .149 .140  -.300 .096 
DMQ x Political Affiliation .040 .694  .120 .513 
DMQ x Education -.100 .323  -.205 .261 
DMQ x Sub. SES .182 .070  .018 .923 
DMQ x Rel. ID Dummy (low vs. high) .075 .457  - - 
DMQ x Polit. Affil. Dummy (conser. vs. 
liberal) 
-.010 .925  .334 .062 
DMQ x Sub. SES Dummy (low vs. high) .258** .010  .027 .884 
DMQ x Religion .308 .008  .218 .492 
Notes. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. The correlation reported for religion is an Eta coefficient. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




Figure 2. DMQ Theme Means by Theme  
 
how South African participants responded personally to these statements. The DMQ-A sample, 
however, shows that there was more consensus amongst participants in terms of the societal 
acceptability of the DMQ statements. Thirdly, from Figure 3, one can see that there is a tendency 
for the lines not to cross (though they sometimes do), which might suggest that the positions of 
themes (e.g., there position on the Overton window) tend to be somewhat similar across 
countries. 
Figure 3. DMQ Theme Means by Sample 
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Table 8. 
Means, Standard Deviations and Within-Country Mean Differences for DMQ Themes 
 India  U.S.  S. Africa 






 E A M 
Diff. 
 E A M 
Diff. 
Theme M SD M SD M SD  M SD M SD  M SD M SD 
RV 3.79 .76 3.91 .68 .12 3.55 .66 .24  2.96 1.09 2.92 .96 .04  2.76 .84 2.83 .79 .07 
XE 3.57 1.01 3.72 .79 .15 3.30 .91 .27  2.68 1.38 2.99 1.02 .31  2.20 .84 2.82 .86 .61 
TT 3.77 .81 3.90 .67 .13 3.57 .73 .20  2.71 1.38 2.92 .91 .21  2.38 .88 2.85 .82 .47 
SB 3.88 .75 3.88 .65 .00 3.63 .59 .25  2.97 1.22 3.08 .92 .11  3.39 .89 3.32 .83 .07 
WE 3.94 .60 3.97 .54 .03 3.81 .56 .13  3.11 1.15 3.12 .90 .01  3.27 .87 3.47 .76 .20 
PV 3.53 .94 3.71 .75 .18 3.19 .87 .34  2.61 1.38 2.66 1.11 .05  1.84 .77 2.34 .86 .49 
ST 3.46 .70 3.82 .70 .36 3.24 .69 .22  2.91 1.10 2.85 .87 .06  2.39 .84 2.56 .77 .17 
PT 3.08 .45 3.92 .55 .84 3.32 .44 .24  2.76 .85 2.89 .50 .13  2.78 .60 2.94 .57 .15 
II 4.08 .74 4.09 .57 .01 4.13 .65 .05  2.98 1.32 3.22 .94 .24  3.32 .83 3.49 .75 .17 
PU 4.09 .49 4.04 .54 .05 3.87 .57 .21  3.26 1.09 3.44 .73 .18  3.84 .70 3.61 .69 .23 
IB 3.12 .79 3.93 .85 .81 3.50 .85 .38  2.74 .99 3.14 .74 .40  3.08 1.08 3.14 1.02 .05 
Total  3.66 .73 3.90 .66 .24 3.56 .68 .23  2.88 1.18 3.02 .87 .16  2.84 .83 3.03 .79 .24 
Notes. A - perceived acceptability measure (DMQ-A). E - personal endorsement (DMQ-E). M – means. SD – standard deviations.  M. Diff. - the 
difference between the DMQ-E and DMQ-A means. Themes: RV – racialist views, XE – xenophobia, TT – traitor talk, SB – sabotage, WE – 




And finally, what is also interesting to note is that across both measures, and across all 
three countries, pro-violence, xenophobia, and support of torture appear to have, on average, 
some of the lowest theme means (i.e., are less endorsed, or more highly condemned; this thought 
appears to consistently (across all samples) have some of the highest theme means (i.e., are more 
endorsed, or more highly praised) (see Table 8 and Figures 2 and 3). This gives us some 
indication that across cultures, certain DMQ themes are viewed as more acceptable in society, 
while others are deemed to be less acceptable (i.e., they are at different points in the Overton 
window).   
Zero-order correlations were examined to assess which measure was more consistent for  
 
the eleven themes across samples. All DMQ-A samples reported significant, strong (all >r=.78) 
correlations between one another (all correlations were positive as was to be expected; see Table 
9). In addition, correlations between DMQ-A samples were also stronger as compared to the 
Table 9.     
Correlation Matrix of DMQ Theme Means and DMQ-E & DMQ-A Samples 














India DMQ-E r 1       
 p-value        
 N 11       
US DMQ-E r .688* 1      
 p-value .019       
 N 11 11      
SA DMQ-E r .477 .834** 1     
 p-value .138 .001      
 N 11 11 11     
India DMQ-A 
Refined 
r .754** .715* .801** 1    
 p-value .007 .013 .003     
 N 11 11 11 11    
India DMQ-A r .457 .708* .848** .887** 1   
 p-value .157 .015 .001 .000    
 N 11 11 11 11 11   
US DMQ-A r .520 .750** .903** .804** .774** 1  
 p-value .101 .008 .000 .003 .005   
 N 11 11 11 11 11 11  
SA DMQ-A r .553 .758** .947** .881** .840** .929** 1 
 p-value .078 .007 .000 .000 .001 .000  
 N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note. IN - India. US - United States. SA - South Africa. In bold are correlations between DMQ-E samples and 
correlations between DMQ-A samples. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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correlations between the DMQ-E samples (see Table 9). This suggests that participant’s average 
theme means were more consistent across countries for the DMQ-A measure than they were for 
the DMQ-E.  
 
RQ1d: Do perceived democidal norms (DMQ-A) affect intended behavior, and how does 
this compare to the effects of personal democidal beliefs (DMQ-E) on intended behavior? 
Overall and across countries, the DMQ-E was a better predictor of the behavioral 
intention items. However, often times the DMQ-A was not far behind (especially for the 
additional eleven behavioral items). In addition, for the most part the DMQ measures (especially, 
the DMQ-E) reported significant findings even after controlling for demographic factors and 
controlling for the VSA and SDO measures. For inter-item reliability analyses and correlations 
between measures (DMQ, VSA and SDO) see Appendix G. 
 
Social distance items 
With regard to the social distance behavior items, the DMQ-E outperformed (i.e., 
explained more variance in more of the items) the DMQ-A in the U.S. and especially in South 
Africa (see Appendix H for all tables relevant to behavioral items). In India, the DMQ-E and 
DMQ-A explained similar amounts of variance in the social distance items (see Tables H.24-
H.27). In India, although the refined DMQ-A explained fewer items significantly, for the items it 
did predict, it explained a great deal of variance in them (~60%; see Tables H.24-H.27).  
Across measures and countries, it does not appear that one of the categories of social 
relations (neighbor, family member or leader) was substantially better explained by the DMQ 
measures than the others. However, in both the U.S. and in India, after controlling for 
demographics and VSA and SDO measures, it appears that the DMQ-E measure was more 
predictive of the leader category (especially a black leader in the U.S. and a Pakistani leader in 
India; see Tables H.17 and H.25), but this was not necessarily the case in the other samples. It 
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also appears that for certain social groups, while the DMQ measures did for the most part explain 
variance in these same groups across the social relation categories (e.g., if the DMQ-E explained 
variance for Christians in the neighbor category, it likely also explained variance in the family 
member and leader categories), this was not always the case. For example, in India, the DMQ-E 
explained about 12-17% of the variance in how likely participants were to accept a Kashmiri 
person as their neighbor but did not explain variance in how likely they were to accept a Kashmiri 
person as their family member or leader (see H.34-H.25). In South Africa, the DMQ-E explained 
around 30% of the variance in how likely participants were to accept a homosexual person as a 
leader, but not how likely they were to accept them as their neighbor or family member (see 
Tables H.20-H.21). This could suggest that a person’s willingness to accept a certain group as a 
specific social relation of theirs, might be somewhat dependent on the combination of group type, 
relation type, and their level of democidal thinking, and have some culture-specificity.  
These results also provide evidence for which groups the DMQ measures did the best job 
of predicting variance for. In India, the DMQ measures did the best job of explaining variance in 
the Pakistanis, homosexuals and foreigners’ items (see Tables H.24-H.27). In the U.S., the 
measures did the best job of explaining variance in the blacks (or African Americans), Muslims, 
and foreigners’ items (see Tables H.16 -H.19). And for South Africa, the DMQ-E (the DMQ-A 
did not report significant findings) did the best job of explaining variance in the Nigerians, 
transgender people, and foreigners (see Tables H.20-H.23). While many of these 
groups/categories are culture-specific, the “foreigner” group appeared to at the top of the list, 
suggesting that this group might be a universal target.  
    
Additional behavioral items 
With regard to the additional eleven behavioral items, the DMQ-E had much more 
predictive power than the DMQ-A, but both measures appeared to preform relatively well (see 
Appendix H for all tables relevant to behavioral items). Both the DMQ-E and the DMQ-A were 
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predictive of a good deal of variance in many of these items, even after controlling for 
demographic factors, as well as the VSA and SDO measures. The DMQ-E and DMQ-A explained 
the most variance (after controlling for demographics and VSA and SDO factors) in the items 
within the U.S. samples (see Tables H.28-H.29), and for some items explained roughly 70-80% 
of the variance. Across all three countries, both the DMQ-E and DMQ-A appear to consistently 
predict item number 3 (see Tables H.28-35). This item asked participants how likely they would 
be to vote in favor of a government policy that would forbid intermarriage between certain ethnic 
groups. The other two items (10 and 11 in the U.S., items 8 and 9 in South Africa, and item 
numbers 10 and 11 in India) which were also consistently predicted by the both measures, and 
also appeared to report some of the largest R-squared values were the items that asked 
participants if they would take part in action to prevent a certain group (country-specific) from 
either moving into their neighborhood or operating a business in their area.  
 
RQ1e: Do perceived democidal norms (DMQ-A) affect related prejudicial attitudes (FIRE 
scale)), and how does this compare to the effects of personal democidal beliefs (DMQ-E) on 
prejudicial attitudes? 
Both DMQ-E and the original DMQ-A samples from India and the United States 
explained a significant amount of variance in the FIRE scores that was not explained by 
demographic variables (see Table 10). In India, the original DMQ-A explained slightly more of 
the variance (22%) in the FIRE scores, while the DMQ-E explained 19% of the variance (Tables 
10). However, when the refined DMQ-A was inputted, it did not significantly explain any 
variance within the FIRE scores, which was likely due to the fact that significance couldn’t be 
reached due to the much smaller sample size (N=32) (Tables 10). In the United States the DMQ-
E explained 41% variance in the FIRE scores in comparison with the DMQ-A which explained 
27% of the variance. Neither the DMQ-E nor the DMQ-A explained a significant amount of the 
variance in South Africa (see Tables 33).  
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Interestingly, in both India and the United States, only the DMQ-A explained a 
significant amount of variance in the FIRE scores that was not explained by demographic 
variables, or the VSA and SDO variables (see Table 11). In India, the original DMQ-A explained 
21% of the variance and in the United States, the DMQ-A explained 27% of the variance. Once 
again, the South African samples did not report any significant values for either DMQ measures 
(see Table 11). This suggests that the DMQ-A, as compared to the DMQ-E, may potentially be a 
more novel predictor of prejudicial attitudes, as there was less overlap in terms of prediction with 
other well-known measures (e.g., SDO and VSA).  
Table 10.      
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for FIRE Controlling for Demographics 
 R Square Adj. R Square R Sq. 
Change 
F Change Sig. F Change 
India - DMQ-E .312 .187 .201 2.335 .014 
India - DMQ-A .343 .216 .268 3.073 .002 
India – Refined 
DMQ-A 
.634 .244 .545 2.030 .101 
U.S. - DMQ-E .502 .411 .446 7.089 .000 
U.S. - DMQ-A .388 .269 .278 3.384 .001 
S. Africa - DMQ-E .263 .118 .097 1.030 .427 
S. Africa - DMQ-A .316 .188 .121 1.459 .161 
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in 




Table 11.       
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for FIRE Controlling for VSA and SDO 








India - DMQ-E 2. w/ VSA & SDO .159 .099 .048 2.785 .067 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .313 .169 .154 1.747 .077 
India - DMQ-A 2. w/VSA & SDO .086 .016 .011 .539 .585 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .354 .211 .268 3.059 .002 
India – Refined 
DMQ-A 
2. w/VSA & SDO .228 .002 .138 2.151 .138 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .659 .186 .431 1.491 .244 
U.S. - DMQ-E 2. w/VSA & SDO .403 .359 .347 27.874 .000 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .512 .409 .110 1.738 .079 
U.S. - DMQ-A 2. w/VSA & SDO .199 .138 .089 5.042 .008 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .404 .270 .205 2.508 .009 
S. Africa - 
DMQ-E 
2. w/VSA & SDO .310 .252 .144 9.909 .000 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .354 .208 .044 .520 .885 
S. Africa - 
DMQ-A 
2. w/VSA & SDO .223 .161 .029 1.840 .164 
 3. w/DMQ Themes .325 .181 .101 1.215 .289 
Note. In bold are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 
1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 2), and DMQ themes in block three (i.e. model 3). 
Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
 
RQ2. Is there evidence of pluralistic ignorance?  
To assess which themes showed the greatest differences between the DMQ-E and DMQ-
A, the mean differences of themes were examined within county and between countries. In India, 
support of torture, polarized thinking and in-group blamelessness showed the greatest mean 
differences between the DMQ-E sample and the DMQ-A sample (see Table 12). When the 
refined DMQ-A sample was used in India, pro-violence and in-group blamelessness showed the 
greatest mean differences between the DMQ-E and DMQ-A refined (see Table 12). In the United 
States, xenophobia, in-group idealization, and in-group blamelessness showed the greatest mean 
differences between measures (see Table 12). And in South Africa, xenophobia, traitor talk, and 
pro-violence showed the greatest differences in means between the DMQ-E and DMQ-A (see 
Table 12). Aggregating across all three countries, the themes with the largest mean differences 
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were xenophobia, polarized thinking, and in-group blamelessness, and ones with the smallest 
mean differences were racialist views, sabotage, and purity of thought (see Table 12 and Figure 
3). Larger differences in theme means between the DMQ-E and DMQ-A measures might indicate 
a certain degree of pluralistic ignorance taking place—people mistakenly report higher or lower 
levels of perceived acceptability of a theme, compared with what the actual levels of agreement 
towards those themes really are. While smaller mean differences suggest that there is perhaps 
little evidence of pluralistic ignorance, and peoples’ reports of acceptability are more closely 
aligned with the actual levels of agreement towards those themes.  
Table 12 
Means and Between-Measure Mean Differences for DMQ Themes  
 E  A       












IN - A 
Refined 
Tot. 





Diff.   A 
- E 
Tot. M A 
(Refined) 
M Diff. 
A - E 
(Refined) 
RV 3.79 2.96 2.76  2.92 2.83 3.91 3.55  3.17 3.22 .05 3.10 -.07 
XE 3.57 2.68 2.2  2.99 2.82 3.72 3.3  2.82 3.18 .36 3.04 .22 
TT 3.77 2.71 2.38  2.92 2.85 3.9 3.57  2.95 3.22 .27 3.11 .16 
SB 3.88 2.97 3.39  3.08 3.32 3.88 3.63  3.41 3.43 .01 3.34 -.07 
WE 3.94 3.11 3.27  3.12 3.47 3.97 3.81  3.44 3.52 .08 3.47 .03 
PV 3.53 2.61 1.84  2.66 2.34 3.71 3.19  2.66 2.90 .24 2.73 .07 
ST 3.46 2.91 2.39  2.85 2.56 3.82 3.24  2.92 3.08 .16 2.88 -.04 
PT 3.08 2.76 2.78  2.89 2.94 3.92 3.32  2.87 3.25 .38 3.05 .18 
II 4.08 2.98 3.32  3.22 3.49 4.09 4.13  3.46 3.60 .14 3.61 .15 
PU 4.09 3.26 3.84  3.44 3.61 4.04 3.87  3.73 3.70 -.03 3.64 -.09 
IB 3.12 2.74 3.08  3.14 3.14 3.93 3.5  2.98 3.40 .42 3.26 .28 
Notes. A - perceived acceptability measure (DMQ-A). E - personal endorsement (DMQ-E).  Tot. M - totals means are 
calculated across samples for the two respective measures. M Diff. - Differences between means are calculated using 
the total theme-mean values. IN – India. U.S – United States. SA- South Africa. Themes: RV – racialist views, XE – 
xenophobia, TT – traitor talk, SB – sabotage, WE – wealthy elite, PV – pro-violence, ST – support of torture, PT – 
polarized thinking, II – in-group idealization, PU – purity of thought, IB – in-group blamelessness.  
 
Evidence of pluralistic ignorance is also discussed under RQ1c as it pertains to the DMQ 
themes. Please see this section for additional results. In order to further explore pluralistic 
ignorance, for each of the seven samples (India DMQ-E, India DMQ-A, India DMQ-A refined, 
U.S DMQ-E, U.S. DMQ-A, South Africa DMQ-E, and South Africa DMQ-A) the means for the 
63 DMQ items were extracted and moved into a new dataset. From here, I was able to compute 
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zero-order correlations, across the set of item means, between the DMQ-E and the DMQ-A 
samples in each country. Overall, in each country, the DMQ-A strongly predicted the DMQ-E 
(see Table 13). The one exception to this was that in India, the original DMQ-A sample only 
weakly predicted the DMQ-E (r=.27, p<.05; see Table 13). This finding only provided further 
validation that using the refined sample was necessary. The refined DMQ-A sample corrected for 
this weak correlation, and like the other samples, it strongly predicted the DMQ-E (r=.87, p<.001; 
see Table 36). The strongest relationship was found between the South African samples (r=.92, 
p<.001; see Table 13). These correlations suggest that these two measures are strongly related but 
that there is still some portion of the measure (esp. in India and the U.S.)  that is left unexplained 
or unassociated.  
Table 13.      
Correlations and Simple Linear Regressions Where DMQ-A is Used to Predict 
DMQ-E in Each Country 
 
 r Adj. R Sq. R Sq. Change F Change Sig. F Change 
India .265* .055 .070 4.625 .035 
India (DMQ-A Refined) .873** .757 .761 194.579 .000 
U.S.  .841** .702 .707 146.941 .000 
S. Africa  .920** .843 .846 334.704 .000 
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05.  
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
 
 
Linear multiple regressions were also conducted on the item means for each country, 
where acceptability (DMQ-A) was used to predict endorsement (DMQ-E). In all three countries 
the DMQ-A significantly accounted for a good amount (70-84%) of the variance (see Table 13). 
Once again, the regular DMQ-A sample in India only explained 5% of the variance in the DMQ-
E; this was again corrected for using the refined DMQ-A sample, which explained 76% of the 
variance (see Table 13). Like the correlations, these results suggest that while the DMQ-E does a 
good job of predicting the DMQ-A (and vice versa), it isn’t able to account for 20 - 30% of the 
variance (see Table 13); acceptability does not always predict endorsement perfectly.  
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The unstandardized residuals that were saved from these regression analyses were then 
examined and the largest residuals identified (see Appendix I for the results). Large residuals 
should indicate that DMQ items that showed the largest differences between actual endorsement 
and perceived acceptability. The DMQ items that produced large, positive residuals, indicated 
that people endorsed these items more than other people perceived or recognized those items as 
being acceptable in their society. The large, negative residuals on the other hand suggest that 
people endorsed these items less than others recognized as being acceptable. There are a few 
inferences that can be taken away from these large residuals. Firstly, it appears that (on average 
across countries) three xenophobia-theme items produced large, negative residuals, suggesting 
that people endorsed these statements less than others actually perceived them as acceptable in 
their society (see Appendix I for the results). Two of the traitor-talk items also produced large 
negative residuals, also suggesting that people endorsed these statements less than others actually 
perceived them to be acceptable (see Appendix I). Secondly, and on the other end, two of the 
support-of-torture items (48 and 52) generated large, positive residuals, suggesting that people 
endorsed these statements more than others actually perceived them as acceptable in their society 
(see Appendix I). What is interesting here is that these two support-of-torture items were 
opposites of one another—one item stated, “torture is never acceptable” and the other “there are 
times and places where torture is acceptable”.  From the country-level residuals, we can see that 
this finding is driven mostly by the Indian samples. One possible explanation for this finding is 
that the Indian samples showed more yea-saying, and thus more variance can be attributed to 
acquiescence, which in turn could make opposite-content items such as these look uncorrelated 
(or even slightly positive-correlated). Another possibility is that participants (especially in the 
Indian samples) might have missed the “never” in the first item and responded similarly to both 
items. And the final take-away from these residuals is that four items (30, 32 38, and 52) out of 
the six opposite-content (i.e., the anti-democidal items) items produced, large positive residuals 
(see Appendix I). The indication here is that anti-democidal attitudes are more strongly endorsed 
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This dissertation explored the extent to which a newly developed acceptability response scale 
(DMQ-A) was a better guide for measuring democidal thinking in a society, as compared to the 
endorsement scale (DMQ-E). Additionally, this research provided further application and testing 
of the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire—one of the first tools to measure exclusionary thinking. 
Landau et al. (2020) developed a way in which to measure the Democidal Mindset at a self-report 
level, giving one the ability to assess an individual’s personal endorsement of these items. And 
while the current study also employs a measure of personal endorsement, it expands previous 
research on the Democidal Mindset by measuring the perceived acceptability of the mindset. This 
perceived acceptability scale may allow one to measure the levels of democidal thinking at a 
cultural or societal level. Research suggests that shared societal or ideological belief structures 
have far greater impact or force than the individual levels of sincere endorsements that underlie 
them (Leader Maynard, 2019). Moreover, as encapsulated by the Overton window and theories of 
culture and social perception, we know that public opinion can have several important impacts. It 
can: shape politics and constrain or liberate political actors, influence a population’s perceptions 
and in turn their willingness to express their own beliefs and finally, may influence the behavior 
of both leaders and population. Consequently, measuring the cultural (i.e., normative) levels of 
democidal or exclusionary thinking could possibly be more useful (or at least could provide 
additional insight) when it comes to understanding mass killing. And although the results do not 
conclusively point to one measure being far superior to the other in all respects, they do seem to 
give some indication of the context wherein each method performs best.  
On average, people appear to report higher levels of perceived acceptability of democidal 
thinking in comparison to the levels of reported endorsement in their countries, at least so long as 
one assumes that the 0-4 response scales that were used for the two types of data correspond 
fully. This finding was stable across all three countries. Although more research is needed here, 
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this result could suggest that some form of pluralistic ignorance is occurring; people misreport 
more acceptability of democidal beliefs than actually exists, much like students misreporting the 
levels of alcohol consumption on college campuses.  
Investigation into the psychometric qualities indicated that inter-rater consistency was 
high in all samples and for both measures. The one exception to this was that the DMQ-A sample 
in India demonstrated much poorer psychometric qualities. There are a few possible reasons why 
~70 of the participants’ responses were abnormal in this particular sample. Firstly, the DMQ-A 
measure is novel and not like a typical self-report survey (like the DMQ-E)—instead it asks 
participants to surmise the attitudes and beliefs of one’s society, and this may have been a 
problematically unfamiliar task for much of the India sample. Adding to this, English fluency 
might have also posed more of a problem here than it did for the DMQ-E sample, for participants 
might have struggled more with understanding the response scale of the DMQ-A and words 
within it such as “commended,” “tolerated” or “condemned”. In response to this unfamiliarity 
many respondents may have resorted to random or highly acquiescent patterns of responding. 
Another possible reason for this is that, in general, MTurk data coming from India is often 
observed to be of poorer quality (Feitosa, Joseph, & Newman, 2015; Khanna et al., 2010), so this 
sample might have just been as unlucky collection of participants and more affected by poor 
quality and unreliable responses. This would be strange however, for the DMQ-E data, which was 
collected in the same manner and around the same times was not similarly affected. Nonetheless, 
after investigative analyses were conducted, and the sample size was reduced to a smaller set of 
participants, the data appeared to be more reliable. Although the lessened statistical power in the 
reduced sample made statistical significance less likely to be observed, both samples (original and 
refined) were used throughout the analyses, allowing for comparisons to be made.  
Furthermore, pertaining to the discussion of psychometric qualities, while inter-rater 
consistency was high, unidimensionality of the raters (i.e., homogeneity across the group rather 
than a heterogeneous collection of homogeneous subgroups) in both the personal endorsement 
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and the acceptability scales was unsatisfactory. As it applies to raters, unsatisfactory 
unidimensionality suggests that there is some cultural heterogeneity within countries. Now, this is 
not surprising, as one would expect participants (i.e., raters) in country samples to come from 
different ‘cultural subgroups’ and thus report a range of different responses. However, whichever 
scale (DMQ-E or DMQ-A) pulls in less of this cultural heterogeneity should be better at assessing 
a society as a whole (rather than an individual) for the democidal thinking—i.e., it should be 
more reliable across subgroups within that society.  The results suggest that in India and the U.S. 
the DMQ-A might indeed be the better measure to use for this purpose, for it pulled in less of this 
cultural heterogeneity. South Africa reported very similar levels of rater unidimensionality for the 
DMQ-E and DMQ-A. Furthermore, in India and the U.S., the DMQ-A samples (as compared to 
the DMQ-E) were also more normally distributed in relation to individuals’ scores on the DMQ 
items (as one might expect for errors around a true underlying score).  
The DMQ-A reported lower standard deviations across demographic factors in 
comparison to the DMQ-E, suggesting that there was less variability in the acceptability scale, 
even across demographic subgroups. Moreover, in all three countries (and especially so in South 
Africa), the DMQ-A was less influenced by demographic factors as compared to the DMQ-E. 
One notable case was that in the United States, political affiliation appeared to be significantly 
associated with the DMQ-E. People who reported being more politically conservative, also 
reported higher levels of endorsement of democidal statements. This result, while not as strong, 
was also found in the South African samples (and more so in the DMQ-E than the DMQ-A 
sample). These findings are likely not isolated observations, for holding politically conservative 
attitudes has also been shown to be related to scoring highly on on other related measures, such as 
right-wing authoritarianism (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018) and social dominance orientation (Ho et 
al., 2015).  In summary, it appears that the acceptability measure might prove to be less affected 
by demographic factors (including the individual political affiliation of respondents), but larger 
more representative samples are needed to support this. In addition, the results also seemed to 
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suggest that with regard to the Democidal Mindset, political affiliation and subjective SES might 
be worthwhile demographics to explore in future studies.   
With regard to the eleven Democidal Mindset themes, there appeared to be lower 
standard deviations in people’s average theme scores on the DMQ-A than there was on the DMQ-
E, and thus potentially more consistency in how participants responder to items within each 
theme using the DMQ-A scale. In addition, participants average theme means were more 
consistent (i.e., more strongly correlated) across countries for the DMQ-A measure than they 
were for the DMQ-E. This indicates that perhaps the DMQ-A is a better measure to be used when 
seeking to identify pancultural phenomena.  
And finally, an examination of the theme means did produce two interesting and 
potentially cross-cultural findings. Firstly, across the three countries, the themes that showed the 
largest differences between their average scores, and thus potentially showed the greatest 
evidence of pluralistic ignorance occurring, were xenophobia, polarized thinking, and in-group 
blamelessness. And the themes that showed the small differences, potentially suggesting lower 
levels of misperceptions (i.e., less evidence of pluralistic ignorance) were racialist views, 
sabotage, and purity of thought. And secondly, when examining the theme means across 
countries, xenophobia, pro-violence and support of torture appear to consistently have some of 
the lowest theme means (i.e., are less endorsed, or more highly condemned), and wealthy elite, 
in-group idealization and purity of thought appear to have some of the highest theme means (i.e., 
are more endorsed, or more highly praised). This gives us some indication that across cultures, at 
least as far as these three sets of samples would indicate, certain DMQ themes are viewed as more 
acceptable in society, while others are deemed to be less acceptable.   
But in terms of predicting behavioral intentions, the DMQ-E on average, performed 
better than the DMQ-A. This is to be expected, for a person’s endorsement of beliefs should also 
correspond with their behavioral intentions on related issues. For the social distancing items, 
which asked participants about specific groups, the DMQ items seemed to best predict behavioral 
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intentions towards the most recognized discriminated-against groups in those countries; Muslims 
and Adivasis in India, blacks (or African Americans) and Muslims in the U.S. and Nigerians in 
South Africa. In addition, the other group that the DMQ items consistently predicted across all 
three countries was “foreigners”. This confirms that attitudes towards these groups and 
“foreigners” are particularly salient and associated with the democidal thinking items. With 
regard to the additional set of behavioral intention items, the DMQ measures (both DMQ-E and 
DMQ-A) appeared to do the best job at predicting items that asked participants about voting in 
favor to forbid intermarriage between ethnic groups and items that asked participants if they 
would take action to prevent a specific group (e.g., people from NE India, or people from Mexico 
or Central America) from either moving into their neighborhood or operating a business in their 
area. These are all outcomes that involve direct daily interaction with members of some out-
group.  
In contrast, when it came to predicting prejudicial attitudes (via the means of the FIRE 
scale), it appears that the DMQ-A might perform better. While there were no significant results in 
the refined India DMQ-A sample, or either sample in South Africa, in India and the U.S. the 
DMQ-A predicted prejudicial attitudes (after controlling for demographics and VSA and SDO 
variables) when the DMQ-E did not. One potential explanation for this, is that by including the 
VSA and SDO—self-report predictors of prejudice—into the model in the second step, and then 
including another self-report predictor of prejudice (which was also highly correlated with the 
VSA and SDO), the DMQ-E, in the third step, the final model didn’t add much additional 
prediction. The DMQ-A, which unlike the VSA, SDO, and DMQ-E is not a typical self-report 
predictor, might have explained a unique portion of the variance in prejudicial attitudes that the 
DMQ-E was not able to explain. That is, the DMQ-A enables a complementary, more indirect 
assessment of racism, along the lines of views that racist attitudes are ‘pretty widely accepted in 
my society’, and thus, perhaps implicitly suggesting that these attitudes are fine, for ‘everyone 
does it’. 
 69 
And finally, the present study tried to ascertain (in the ways that it could) if there was any 
evidence that pluralistic ignorance existed. Due to the fact that two distinct response scales 
(endorsement and acceptability) were used to measure democidal thinking, comparisons between 
measures are fraught with issues and thus the findings presented are only approximates. Overall, 
while the DMQ-A was closely associated with and explained a great deal of variance in the 
DMQ-E, there still existed ~25% of variance that could not be explained from one platform to the 
other. This finding, along with the fact that the overall DMQ means were higher in the DMQ-A 
samples, could be a potential indication that pluralistic ignorance is present. People had a 
tendency to rate DMQ statements as being acceptable to a higher proportion than there were 
levels of actual endorsement of those same items. A review of the saved residuals also produced a 
couple interesting findings. The residuals indicate that for three of the xenophobia-theme items, 
people endorsed these statements less than others actually perceived them as being acceptable in 
their society. It is possible that findings such as this one (e.g., people assuming that their society 
is more anti-foreigner than the actual attitudes of people suggest) might occur often, and possibly 
be a driving force behind why certain discriminatory policies are tolerated or accepted in a 
society, even when the actual sentiment or support towards them is a lot weaker than one would 
think. When the acceptability is higher than the endorsement for a particularly dangerous attitude, 
it might imply that there is “room to grow” for that attitude—i.e., people are prepared to tolerate 
it even if many don’t endorse it. Another finding from the residuals implied that certain anti-
democidal items were more strongly endorsed that other people perceived them to be. This is a 
positive finding, suggesting that people are less democidal than people tend to assume. While it 
was not possible to do in the present study (due to constraints of money and the survey length), 
future studies could measure pluralistic ignorance more precisely by asking the same participants 
to rate both the perceived acceptability of and their own level of agreement to the same democidal 
mindset items. However, the findings provided here do indicate what one might find if this sort of 
study was conducted.  
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In summary, while the DMQ-E appears to be a better predictor of an individual’s 
intended behavior, the DMQ-A seems to produce more inter-rater convergence with less 
variability and thus, provides a more efficient way to discern the pattern within a population—
fewer respondents might be needed. In addition, the DMQ-A could also end up being a more 
novel predictor (as compared than DMQ-E) of related prejudicial attitudes (as an increment above 
other well-known measures), but more research is needed here before making such a claim. It is 
also worthwhile to note, that with regard to predicting intended behavior, not only were both 
DMQ measures able to explain variance in some of these items even after controlling for 
authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation, they also tended to produce levels of 
prediction that were comparable to these other scales/measures (see results for more details). 
These findings provide further support for the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire and suggests 
that it is measuring something unique that cannot be completely explained by measures of 
authoritarianism or a person’s views on group-based inequality. 
This work has relevance in both the academic community and in the field of atrocity 
prevention. First it shows how one might measure beliefs and attitudes at a societal or cultural 
level. While self-reports are useful tools, using a response scale to measure the perceived societal 
acceptability may provide a better method for judging the normative framework as it pertains to 
certain beliefs and, here, the relative degree to which a facilitative ‘pro-democidal culture’ exists 
in a population. In turn, this normative framework could give us insight into what is considered to 
be acceptable or unacceptable in a society, and therefore what types of actions or policies might 
be tolerated or even viewed as popular by the public. In conjunction, what the public considers to 
be normative may also influence the political arena, in terms of what types of leaders get elected 
and the subsequent policies they decide to implement. As it relates to the atrocity-prevention 
community, measuring democidal thinking in a population or community might prove useful for 
the purposes of conflict analysis, and in particular, for early-warning detection. As the Early 
Warning Project—the first public early warning system for mass atrocities available—states, 
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“[atrocities] are always preceded by a range of early warning signs. If these signs are detected, 
their causes can be addressed, preventing the potential for catastrophic progression” (Early 
Warning Project, n.d.). In line with this thinking, people’s beliefs and attitudes (and in turn their 
speech) can be used to detect early warning signs of exclusionary or dangerous thinking. Early 
warning is an effective and inexpensive way to tackle mass killing before it occurs. Where a 
general population falls along the spectrum of approval or disapproval of the mindset could be a 
protective factor or risk factor, advantageously tapping into what the population is prone to 
tolerate or not tolerate in the way of democidal behavior. Higher pre-existing approval in a 
general population may correspond to a higher risk for electing a leader who disseminates 
exclusionary rhetoric. Over time, changes in a society’s levels of acceptability of these attitudes 
may also reflect a society’s radicalization. In addition, the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire 
items might be used on the ground by practitioners to survey locals, giving one the ability to 
gauge community sentiment. In the future, a shortened and possibly culture-specific version of 
the Democidal Mindset might be implemented in a variety of contexts. This might be a good first 
step for local programs and NGOs aimed at preventative work (such as Search for Common 
Ground or Mercy Corps) in the community to take, allowing them to assess the current 
environment. Practitioners would be able to survey communities, for democidal thinking, much 
like the U.S. government uses MPICE (Agolia & Sotirin, 2010) to assess environments of 
conflict. From this, practitioners may be able to develop norm-based inventions to decrease 
democidal thinking in a community. Building on the research of pluralistic ignorance, we know 
that norm-based interventions have shown some success (Miller & Prentice, 2016) in changing 
perceptions. Miller and Prentice (2016) also note that an issue with many of these norm-based 
interventions is that the majority of them have relied on self-report data. The perceived 
acceptability scale could somewhat resolve this issue. Rather than asking participants to self-
report their own beliefs or attitudes, the perceived acceptability measure asks participants to 
report how acceptable or unacceptable they believe certain beliefs, attitudes or values to be in 
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their society. This would also help to decrease any social desirability bias (i.e., participants 
reporting beliefs that would be deemed as more socially acceptable rather than reporting what 
they truly believe).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A considerable limitation of this study is that it relies on data from online survey 
platforms, and in particular, relies on data from Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (for the Indian and 
U.S. samples). While most psychological research is typically conducted on university students 
(which also comes with its own issues), I felt that for this particular content, it called for a wider 
representation of participants from the general community. The easiest and most affordable way 
to collect participants from the larger community is through the means of MTurk. Due to limited 
funds, I was unable to pay for additional qualifications on MTurk that might have improved the 
quality of the data. While I was able to use a Qualtrics panel for my South African samples, it 
was considerably more expensive than the MTurk samples. In the future, this research would 
ideally be conducted on larger and more well-balanced samples. In addition, future studies could 
also focus on surveying particular subgroups within a society that may be at greater risk for 
displaying democidal thinking. Such studies could prove useful for NGOs such as the Southern 
Poverty Law Center.  
An additional limitation is that the Democidal Mindset and the subsequent Democidal 
Mindset Questionnaire (DMQ) items represent very new research. More testing is needed. 
Thresholds and baseline levels of what is considered a “normal” level of democidal thinking and 
what is an unusually high level of democidal thinking need to be determined. Longitudinal data is 
also needed in order to monitor how democidal thinking may change over time. Nevertheless, this 
research has introduced a promising line of inquiry. 
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Conclusion     
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to compare two response scales of 
democidal thinking—actual endorsement (DMQ-E) and perceived acceptability (DMQ-A)—in 
three different countries. A scale that measures perceived acceptability (as compared to individual 
endorsement) has the potential to provide a way to measure democidal thinking at a societal or 
cultural level, which may prove more useful when analyzing instances of mass killing. Though 
the present findings are mixed, they do suggest that the DMQ-A produces results with less 
variance. While the DMQ-E proved to be a better predictor of behavioral intention, the DMQ-A 
appeared to be a slightly more novel predictor of prejudicial attitudes (as an increment above 
other well-known measures such as the VSA or SDO). This research not only provides further 
testing of the Democidal Mindset, but it also expands the work by applying theoretical concepts 
such as the Overton window and pluralistic ignorance to craft an original way to measure 
democidal thinking. Eventually, this research could provide insights for tracking the performance 





THEMES FOR 10-FACTOR DMQ MODEL 
 
Themes for 10-Factor DMQ Model (Landau et al., 2020) 
Theme Number Theme Label 
1 Racialist views 
2 Xenophobia 
3 Traitor talk 
4 Sabotage (internal enemies) 
5 Wealthy elite 
6 Pro-violence 
7 Support of torture 
8 Polarized thinking 
9 In-group idealization  
10 Purity of thought 
13 In-group blamelessness  




COMPARISON OF THE OVERTON WINDOW AND DMQ-A DEGREES OF ACCEPTANCE 
 
 
Comparison of the Overton Window and DMQ-A Degrees of Acceptance 
The Overton Window Degrees of Acceptance DMQ-A Response Scale 










FIRE SCALE VERSIONS 
 
Fear, Institutional Racism and Empathy (FIRE; DeSante & Smith, 2018) 
 
United States: original version of FIRE scale  
1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 
2. I am fearful of people of other races. 
3. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. 
4. I am angry that racism exists. 
 
India: adapted FIRE scale 
1. Hindus in India have certain advantages because of their religion. 
2. I am fearful of people of other religions. 
3. Religious conflicts in India are rare, isolated situations. 
4. I am angry that religious prejudice exists. 
 
South Africa: adapted FIRE scale 
1. White people in South Africa have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 
2. I am fearful of people of other races. 
3. Racial problems in South Africa are rare, isolated situations. 
4. I am angry that racism exists. 
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APPENDIX D 
SOCIAL DISTANCE QUESTIONS AND GROUPS FOR EACH COUNTRY 
 
These items are loosely based on Bogardus’ (1933) Social Distance Scale. For each country, 
participants indicate their willingness to participate in a social relationship or contract with a 
person from a particular group. The following three questions were asked for each of the 
corresponding social groups selected for that country.  
 
1. Below is a list of various groups of people. For each group, please state how likely you 
would be to accept them as your neighbors (living next to you). 
2. Below is a list of various groups of people. For each group, please state how likely you 
would be to accept them as a member of your family. 
3. Below is a list of various groups of people. For each group, please state how likely you 
would be to accept them as a military leader or  president of your country. 
 







7. People from the North East of India 
8. Homosexuals 
9. Transgender people 




Groups Selected for U.S. 
1. Blacks (or African Americans) 
2. Jews 
3. Muslims 
4. Mexicans/Latin Americans 
5. Homosexuals 
6. Transgender people 
7. Immigrants /Migrants 
8. Foreigners 
 






6. Transgender people 





BEHAVIORAL INTENTION ITEMS FOR EACH COUNTRY 
 
The following seven items were included in all three countries. 
 
1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to shut down a group on social media, known 
for propagating hate speech against immigrants? 
2. How likely would you be to join a community-based group (supported by the 
government) responsible for policing your community for local traitors or enemies? 
3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a government policy that would forbid 
intermarriage between certain ethnic groups? 
4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy that made it illegal for the government to 
censor journalists whenever it chose to? 
5. How likely would you be to support a policy that helped refugees to come to your 
country? 
6. How likely would you be to support the police taking aggressive actions to remove illegal 
immigrants? 
7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy that would require people to carry 
identification cards displaying one's ethnic/racial/religious (country-specific) 
identification with them at all times? 
 
The following items were country specific: 
India 
1. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent Muslims from... - moving 
into your neighborhood?  
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2. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent Muslims from... -operating a 
business in your area?” 
3. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people from the North East 
of India (ex. from Assam) from... -moving into your neighborhood?  
4. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people from the North East 
of India (ex. from Assam) from... -operating a business in your area?” 
U.S.  
1. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who have come here 
from Mexico or Central America from ... -moving into your neighborhood?  
2. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who have come here 
from Mexico or Central America from... -operating a business in your area? 
3. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent blacks (African Americans) 
from ... -moving into your neighborhood? 
4. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent blacks (African Americans) 
from... -operating a business in your area?” 
South Africa 
1. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who have come here 
from other countries in Africa from... - Moving into your neighborhood? 
2. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who have come here 




DEMOCIDAL MINDSET QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE SCALES 
 
Democidal Mindset Questionnaire - Endorsement (DMQ-E). Using this scale participants 
were asked to rate their own agreement (or disagreement) of the Democidal Mindset 
Questionnaire items. 
4 - Definitely Agree - I would proudly associate myself with this view 
3 - Moderately Agree - I would tend to associate myself with this view 
2 - Neutral - I am uncertain whether to associate myself with this view 
1 - Moderately Disagree - I would tend to disassociate myself from this view 
0 - Definitely Disagree - I would strongly disassociate myself from this view [even in the sense of 
'I would certainly not want to be associated with such a view!'] 
 
Democidal Mindset Questionnaire - Acceptability (DMQ-A). Using this scale participants 
were asked to rate their perceived acceptability of the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire items in 
their country. 
4 – Praised and commended, most people would express their approval of this 
3 – Commonly accepted, most people would be willing to say this (but would not expect to be 
praised for saying it) 
2- Tolerated, most would disagree, but they would put up with others saying this 
1 – Disapproved, most people would express their disapproval of this 
0- Condemned, considered by most people to be so unacceptable that anyone saying this would 




SCALE PSYCHOMETRICS AND CORRELATIONS
Table G.14.         
Psychometric Qualities of Scales  
   α Stdzd. α MIC ICC VIC VIM 
US DMQ-E DMQ 63 .987 .986 .521 .541 .082 .112 
 VSA 6 .743 .732 .313 .325 .060 .140 
 SDO 8 .865 .862 .438 .444 .045 .171 
US DMQ-A DMQ 63 .979 .977 .401 .424 .075 .130 
 VSA 6 .627 .618 .212 .219 .024 .060 
 SDO 8 .715 .702 .227 .239 .064 .227 
IN DMQ-E DMQ 63 .949 .947 .220 .229 .041 .290 
 VSA 6 .456 .467 .128 .123 .019 .134 
 SDO 8 .546 .477 .102 .131 .070 .177 
IN DMQ-A DMQ 63 .956 .956 .255 .258 .013 .026 
VSA 6 .649 .645 .231 .301 .235 .041 
SDO 8 .775 .776 .302 .301 .012 .010 
IN DMQ-A 
Refined 
DMQ 63 .946 .946 .218 .219 .033 .123 
VSA 6 .569 .551 .170 .180 .032 .132 
SDO 8 .705 .710 .234 .230 .033 .064 
SA DMQ-E DMQ 63 .927 .924 .167 .162 .025 .578 
 VSA 6 .577 .579 .186 .185 .025 .122 
 SDO 8 .589 .610 .164 .152 .007 .271 
SA DMQ-A DMQ 63 .937 .937 .191 .192 .023 .276 
 VSA 6 .553 .550 .169 .171 .016 .120 
 SDO 8 .678 .682 .211 .208 .009 .092 
Notes. MIC - mean of inter-item correlations. ICC - intraclass correlation single 
measures.  
VIC - variance of inter-item correlations. VIM - variance of the inter-item means. US - 
United States. IN - India. SA - South Africa. DMQ – Democidal Mindset Questionnaire. 
VSA – Very Short Authoritarianism scale. SDO - Social Dominance Orientation. 
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Table G.15.     
Correlation Matrix of Scales 
    DMQ VSA SDO 
US DMQ-E 
DMQ 1   
VSA .807** 1  
SDO .743** .701** 1 
US DMQ-A 
DMQ 1   
VSA .392** 1  
SDO .706** .365** 1 
IN DMQ-E 
DMQ 1   
VSA .715** 1  
SDO .747** .673** 1 
IN DMQ-A 
DMQ 1   
VSA .780** 1  
SDO .842** .681** 1 
IN DMQ-A Refined 
DMQ 1   
VSA .687** 1  
SDO .775** .598** 1 
SA DMQ-E 
DMQ 1   
VSA .451** 1  
SDO .419** .087 1 
SA DMQ-A 
DMQ 1   
VSA .212* 1  
SDO .467** -.168 1 
Notes. US - United States. IN - India. SA - South Africa. DMQ - participant means scores on 
Democidal Mindset items. VSA - participant means scores on Very Short Authoritarianism 
scale. SDO - participant means scores on Social Dominance Orientation. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX H 
INTENDED BEHAVIORAL ITEMS RESULTS FOR EACH COUNTRY 
 
 
Table H.16.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for US DMQ-E and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for Demographics 
  Neighbor       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  




















.372 .247 .168 .030 
    
.379 .257 .216 .005 
    
.441 .331 .273 .000 
Jews .313 .177 .151 .083     .403 .285 .187 .010     .344 .215 .215 .008 
Muslims .366 .241 .182 .019     .446 .336 .302 .000     .384 .262 .225 .003 
Mexicans/Lati
n Americans .336 .205 .188 .020     .380 .257 .208 .006     .356 .229 .201 .011 
Homosexuals .381 .259 .142 .068     .351 .222 .121 .162     .370 .245 .177 .021 
Transgender 
people .303 .166 .107 .302     .294 .154 .170 .053     .265 .120 .130 .195 
Immigrants 
/Migrants .326 .193 .224 .007     .452 .343 .376 .000     .339 .208 .222 .006 
Foreigners .340 .210 .203 .012     .403 .285 .259 .001     .252 .104 .150 .124 
Note. These questions asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor, member of their family, or a military leader 
or president. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e., model 
2). Only results from model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.17.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for U.S. DMQ-E and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for VSA and SDO 
    Neighbors       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  





























2. w/VSA & SDO .287 .227 .083 .005 
  
.301 .242 .138 .000   .332 .276 .164 .000 
3. w/DMQ Themes .382 .242 .095 .322 .401 .266 .100 .253   .488 .372 .155 .016 
Jews 
2. w/VSA & SDO .234 .169 .072 .014 .310 .252 .094 .002   .176 .106 .046 .077 
3. w/DMQ Themes .339 .189 .105 .290 .420 .289 .111 .164   .352 .205 .176 .031 
Muslims 
2. w/VSA & SDO .248 .185 .064 .020 .250 .187 .106 .002   .248 .184 .089 .005 
3. w/DMQ Themes .374 .232 .126 .135 .469 .349 .219 .001   .425 .295 .177 .014 
Mexicans/Lati
n Americans 
2. w/VSA & SDO .262 .200 .115 .001 .318 .261 .147 .000   .199 .131 .044 .080 
3. w/DMQ Themes .366 .222 .104 .270 .412 .278 .093 .293   .387 .249 .188 .014 
Homosexuals 
2. w/VSA & SDO .312 .254 .072 .009 .290 .230 .060 .021   .248 .185 .055 .035 
3. w/DMQ Themes .439 .312 .127 .082 .371 .229 .081 .467   .403 .268 .155 .040 
Transgender 
people 
2. w/VSA & SDO .257 .194 .060 .025 .214 .148 .090 .006   .183 .114 .048 .067 
3. w/DMQ Themes .343 .194 .086 .452 .320 .167 .107 .302   .297 .138 .114 .277 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
2. w/VSA & SDO .234 .170 .132 .001 .370 .316 .293 .000   .247 .184 .130 .001 
3. w/DMQ Themes .353 .207 .119 .185 .501 .388 .131 .037   .415 .283 .168 .022 
Foreigners 
2. w/VSA & SDO .275 .214 .138 .000 .352 .298 .208 .000   .196 .129 .094 .005 
3. w/DMQ Themes .359 .214 .084 .453 .471 .351 .119 .085   .352 .205 .155 .061 
Notes. This question asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor (living near or next to them). In bold 
are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 




Table H.18                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for US DMQ-A and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for Demographics 
  Neighbors       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  




















.319 .176 .153 .098 
    
.222 .058 .084 .647 
    
.271 .118 .131 .228 
Jews .257 .101 .099 .472     .242 .083 .139 .213     .196 .028 .141 .242 
Muslims .359 .224 .107 .281     .314 .170 .082 .563     .341 .203 .072 .633 
Mexicans/Latin 
Americans .248 .090 .113 .365     .154 -.023 .055 .914     .244 .085 .077 .684 
Homosexuals .278 .126 .099 .448     .335 .195 .199 .022     .277 .125 .117 .306 
Transgender 
people .234 .073 .092 .554     .297 .150 .145 .141     .204 .037 .092 .590 
Immigrants 
/Migrants .208 .041 .102 .503     .264 .109 .102 .440     .142 -.038 .067 .844 
Foreigners .299 .152 .187 .044     .210 .044 .100 .514     .191 .021 .089 .627 
Note. These questions asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor, member of their family, or a 
military leader or president. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ 
themes in block two (i.e., model 2). Only results from model 2 are reported.   
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Table H.19.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for U.S. DMQ-A and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for VSA and SDO 
    Neighbors       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  





























2. w/VSA & 
SDO .219 .150 .054 .050 
  
.169 .095 .031 .196   .157 .082 .891 .405 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .323 .161 .104 .370 .246 .065 .078 .696   .275 .101 .882 .321 
Jews 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .204 .133 .045 .084 .170 .096 .067 .031   .100 .020 .045 .111 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .281 .108 .077 .667 .263 .086 .093 .535   .205 .013 .105 .503 
Muslims 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .258 .192 .007 .671 .242 .174 .010 .566   .269 .204 .000 .977 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .359 .205 .101 .351 .317 .153 .076 .644   .360 .206 .091 .440 
Mexicans/Latin 
Americans 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .180 .107 .045 .090 .132 .055 .033 .189   .192 .120 .025 .247 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .257 .079 .077 .690 .172 -.027 .039 .974   .257 .078 .065 .803 
Homosexuals 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .287 .223 .107 .002 .222 .153 .086 .009   .197 .126 .037 .132 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .343 .185 .056 .813 .346 .189 .125 .204   .281 .108 .084 .607 
Transgender 
people 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .213 .143 .071 .020 .191 .119 .038 .125   .116 .037 .004 .834 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .261 .083 .048 .920 .300 .131 .109 .360   .208 .017 .092 .607 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .182 .109 .076 .018 .228 .159 .065 .026   .105 .025 .030 .226 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .245 .063 .063 .827 .274 .099 .046 .925   .144 -.061 .040 .976 
Foreigners 
2. w/VSA & 
SDO .175 .102 .063 .036 .140 .063 .030 .213   .113 .034 .012 .554 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .314 .149 .139 .166 .213 .023 .073 .766   .192 -.002 .079 .735 
Notes. This question asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor (living near or next to them). In bold 
are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. 
model 2), and DMQ themes in block three (i.e. model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported.  
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Table H.20.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for S. Africa DMQ-E and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for Demographics 
  Neighbors       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  





















.199 .040 .155 .143 
    
.318 .184 .206 .013 
    
.240 .090 .115 .309 
Nigerians 
.252 .104 .231 .012 
    
.309 .172 .231 .006 
    
.191 .031 .120 .328 
Congolese 
.243 .094 .188 .044 
    
.308 .171 .166 .054 
    
.236 .084 .104 .400 
Indians/Asians .245 .095 .144 .148     .225 .071 .156 .122     .214 .059 .079 .653 
Homosexuals .237 .086 .161 .099     .245 .095 .135 .189     .411 .295 .258 .001 
Transgender 
people 
.279 .137 .197 .026 
    
.392 .271 .187 .012 
    
.354 .226 .216 .006 
Immigrants/Migran
ts 
.160 -.006 .146 .207 
    
.247 .098 .180 .054 
    
.252 .105 .176 .060 
Foreigners 
.252 .104 .211 .021 
    
.297 .158 .257 .003 
    
.143 -.026 .066 .825 
Note. This question asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor (living near or next to them). In bold 
are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e., model 2). Only 
results from model 2 are reported.  
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Table H.21.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for S. Africa. DMQ-E and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for VSA and SDO 
    Neighbors       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  
























2. w/VSA & SDO .231 .166 .187 .000 
  
.237 .173 .125 .001   .133 .060 .007 .664 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .303 .146 .073 .644 .362 .217 .124 .151   .249 .080 .117 .308 
Nigerians 
2. w/VSA & SDO .074 -.004 .053 .070 .168 .098 .091 .007   .075 
-
.003 .003 .842 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .253 .084 .179 .061 .328 .176 .160 .063   .214 .036 .139 .211 
Congolese 
2. w/VSA & SDO .110 .035 .055 .058 .234 .170 .092 .005   .132 .059 .001 .967 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .263 .096 .153 .118 .334 .183 .100 .338   .241 .069 .109 .375 
Indians/Asia
ns 
2. w/VSA & SDO .247 .184 .147 .000 .163 .093 .095 .006   .143 .071 .008 .646 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .330 .178 .083 .505 .269 .104 .106 .366   .224 .049 .081 .638 
Homosexuals 
2. w/VSA & SDO .196 .129 .120 .001 .256 .193 .146 .000   .408 .358 .255 .000 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .295 .135 .098 .399 .328 .176 .072 .618   .490 .375 .082 .279 
Transgender 
people 
2. w/VSA & SDO .232 .167 .150 .000 .361 .308 .157 .000   .364 .310 .226 .000 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .355 .210 .124 .160 .435 .307 .073 .461   .445 .319 .081 .365 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
2. w/VSA & SDO .121 .047 .107 .004 .218 .152 .152 .000   .182 .113 .105 .003 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .203 .022 .082 .658 .335 .185 .117 .216   .285 .123 .103 .370 
Foreigners 
2. w/VSA & SDO .170 .100 .129 .001 .179 .110 .139 .001   .078 .000 .001 .971 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes .304 .146 .134 .158 .359 .214 .180 .025   .149 
-
.043 .071 .790 
Notes. This question asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor (living near or next to them). In bold 
are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e., 
model 2), and DMQ themes in block three (i.e., model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
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Table H.22.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for S. Africa DMQ-A and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for Demographics 
  Neighbor       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  



















Zimbabweans .199 .049 .099 .438     .121 -.043 .062 .838     .118 -.047 .088 .613 
Nigerians .116 -.049 .093 .571     .203 .054 .052 .868     .136 -.026 .078 .694 
Congolese .207 .059 .119 .275     .216 .070 .094 .461     .183 .030 .125 .258 
Indians/Asians .113 -.053 .069 .785     .154 -.004 .138 .210     .198 .048 .106 .376 
Homosexuals .156 -.001 .098 .487     .096 -.073 .051 .918     .101 -.067 .055 .893 
Transgender 
people .170 .014 .125 .268     .130 -.032 .082 .657     .122 -.041 .073 .746 
Immigrants/Mi
grants .106 -.062 .071 .772     .210 .063 .170 .070     .136 -.025 .104 .455 
Foreigners .181 .028 .119 .296     .109 -.058 .072 .761     .191 .040 .134 .198 
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e., 
model 2). Only results from model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.23.                                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for S. Africa. DMQ-A and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for VSA and SDO 
    Neighbors       Member of your family 
  
Military leader or president  

























2. w/VSA & SDO .123 .053 .023 .277 
  
.077 .004 .018 .380   .042 -.034 .013 .508 
3. w/DMQ Themes .216 .048 .092 .495 .139 -.044 .062 .840   .140 -.044 .098 .527 
Nigerians 
2. w/VSA & SDO .036 -.041 .013 .508 .158 .091 .008 .616   .066 -.009 .008 .659 
3. w/DMQ Themes .128 -.058 .092 .583 .234 .071 .076 .639   .147 -.035 .081 .667 
Congolese 
2. w/VSA & SDO .134 .065 .046 .075 .136 .066 .013 .473   .063 -.012 .005 .765 
3. w/DMQ Themes .238 .075 .104 .370 .234 .070 .098 .420   .192 .019 .129 .242 
Indians/Asians 
2. w/VSA & SDO .087 .014 .043 .098 .056 -.019 .040 .123   .101 .029 .009 .605 
3. w/DMQ Themes .139 -.045 .051 .910 .170 -.007 .114 .364   .202 .032 .101 .431 
Homosexuals 
2. w/VSA & SDO .092 .020 .034 .160 .070 -.004 .025 .264   .048 -.029 .002 .917 
3. w/DMQ Themes .164 -.014 .072 .740 .104 -.087 .034 .982   .109 -.081 .062 .857 
Transgender 
people 
2. w/VSA & SDO .108 .037 .063 .032 .065 -.010 .017 .402   .060 -.015 .010 .574 
3. w/DMQ Themes .204 .035 .097 .469 .156 -.024 .091 .572   .126 -.061 .066 .815 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
2. w/VSA & SDO .096 .024 .062 .036 .099 .027 .059 .042   .043 -.034 .011 .574 
3. w/DMQ Themes .144 -.038 .048 .927 .257 .099 .158 .082   .154 -.026 .111 .399 
Foreigners 
2. w/VSA & SDO .072 -.002 .010 .600 .075 .001 .038 .131   .075 .001 .019 .365 
3. w/DMQ Themes .193 .021 .122 .286 .127 -.059 .052 .909   .219 .052 .144 .149 
Notes. This question asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor (living near or next to them). In bold are model 3 p-values that are 
less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 2), and DMQ themes in block three (i.e. model 3). Results 




Hierarchical Linear Regression for India DMQ-E and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for Demographics     
 Neighbors  Member of your family  Military leader or president 































Muslims  .236 .086 .099 1.027 .430   .212 .059 .212 .059 .737  .129 -.041 .070 .634 .795 
Christians .153 -.013 .135 1.256 .264   .222 .070 .125 1.275 .253  .272 .130 .181 1.964 .042 
Dalits .142 -.026 .098 .908 .537   .270 .127 .142 1.534 .134  .257 .111 .082 .874 .569 
Adivasis .197 .041 .132 1.299 .239   .325 .193 .168 1.966 .042  .296 .158 .228 2.557 .007 
Pakistanis .292 .154 .117 1.312 .232   .292 .153 .146 1.634 .103  .478 .376 .240 3.631 .000 
Kashmiris .268 .125 .185 1.996 .038   .293 .155 .099 1.112 .361  .237 .088 .106 1.104 .368 
Someone 
from the 
North East of 
India 
.239 .091 .177 1.845 .058   .150 -.016 .106 .984 .467  .173 .011 .083 .794 .645 
Homosexuals .403 .287 .212 2.810 .004   .332 .201 .148 1.749 .076  .398 .280 .230 3.023 .002 
Transgender 
people 
.189 .030 .117 1.139 .342   .293 .155 .139 1.554 .127  .313 .178 .202 2.321 .015 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
.221 .068 .151 1.531 .135   .262 .118 .165 1.765 .073  .360 .234 .206 2.547 .008 
Foreigners .260 .115 .206 2.198 .021   .297 .160 .187 2.106 .028  .376 .254 .197 2.496 .009 
Note. These questions asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor, member of their family, or a military leader or 
president. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e., model 2). Only 
results from model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.25.                 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions for India DMQ-E and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for VSA and SDO 
  Neighbors    Member of your family  Military leader or president  
















Muslims 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.14 0.068 0.003 0.838  0.148 0.077 0.005 0.737  0.063 -0.015 0.003 0.85 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.241 0.071 0.101 0.431 0.229 0.057 0.081 0.631  0.14 -0.052 0.077 0.739 
Christians 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.068 -
0.009 
0.05 0.08 0.115 0.041 0.018 0.372  0.125 0.052 0.033 0.168 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.171 -
0.015 
0.102 0.495 0.227 0.054 0.112 0.357  0.275 0.113 0.151 0.111 
Dalits 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.055 -
0.024 
0.012 0.554 0.138 0.066 0.01 0.584  0.175 0.106 0.001 0.97 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.15 -0.04 0.095 0.581 0.282 0.121 0.144 0.13  0.266 0.101 0.091 0.494 
Adivasis 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.077 0.001 0.012 0.544 0.166 0.096 0.009 0.597  0.099 0.023 0.03 0.203 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.203 0.025 0.125 0.29 0.328 0.178 0.163 0.055  0.326 0.175 0.227 0.007 
Pakistanis 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.177 0.108 0.002 0.899 0.207 0.141 0.061 0.028  0.32 0.263 0.081 0.004 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.299 0.142 0.122 0.214 0.3 0.143 0.093 0.428  0.492 0.379 0.173 0.006 
Kashmiris 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.086 0.009 0.003 0.875 0.22 0.155 0.026 0.203  0.132 0.059 0.001 0.969 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.278 0.117 0.192 0.032 0.318 0.166 0.098 0.366  0.248 0.08 0.117 0.301 
Someone from the 
North East of India 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.074 -
0.003 
0.013 0.523 0.053 -
0.026 
0.009 0.648  0.102 0.027 0.012 0.528 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.243 0.074 0.168 0.083 0.151 -
0.038 
0.098 0.547  0.184 0.001 0.082 0.664 
Homosexuals 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.262 0.2 0.07 0.013 0.263 0.202 0.079 0.007  0.28 0.22 0.112 0.001 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.424 0.296 0.163 0.023 0.351 0.207 0.088 0.409  0.439 0.314 0.159 0.022 
Transgender people 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.074 -
0.003 
0.002 0.883 0.164 0.094 0.01 0.573  0.117 0.044 0.006 0.714 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.203 0.024 0.128 0.272 0.293 0.135 0.129 0.182  0.325 0.174 0.208 0.013 
Immigrants /Migrants 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.076 -
0.001 
0.007 0.712 0.119 0.046 0.021 0.322  0.19 0.123 0.037 0.119 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.239 0.068 0.162 0.1 0.264 0.099 0.145 0.139  0.38 0.241 0.19 0.013 
Foreigners 2. w/VSA & SDO 0.095 0.019 0.041 0.119 0.139 0.067 0.029 0.209  0.296 0.238 0.117 0.001 
 3. w/DMQ Themes 0.268 0.105 0.173 0.061 0.299 0.142 0.16 0.073  0.433 0.307 0.137 0.055 
Notes. These questions asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor, member of their family, or a military leader or president. In bold are 
model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 2), and DMQ themes in block three 
(i.e. model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
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Table H.26. 
Hierarchical Linear Regression for India DMQ-A and DMQ-A Refined and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for Demographics 
  Neighbor  Member of your family  Military leader or president 


















Muslims  .231 .072 .163 .119  .237 .079 .206 .037  .241 .083 .168 .101 
Christians .304 .160 .194 .031  .305 .161 .257 .004  .229 .069 .140 .213 
Dalits .199 .033 .186 .081  .271 .120 .191 .044  .145 -.032 .104 .534 
Adivasis .266 .114 .213 .024  .269 .118 .089 .535  .246 .090 .198 .043 
Pakistanis .358 .224 .296 .001  .401 .276 .317 .000  .497 .393 .407 .000 





.196 .029 .148 .202  .137 -.042 .064 .860  .241 .084 .175 .083 
Homosexual
s 
.354 .220 .232 .006  .420 .300 .289 .000  .364 .232 .296 .001 
Transgender 
people 
.184 .015 .145 .227  .338 .201 .176 .041  .181 .012 .115 .413 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
.252 .097 .181 .066  .248 .092 .185 .060  .419 .298 .305 .000 
Foreigners .247 .091 .167 .100  .201 .035 .165 .135  .440 .324 .287 .000 
DMQ-A 
Refined 
Muslims  .648 .222 .482 .162  .723 .387 .458 .095  .712 .362 .518 .073 
Christians .499 -.110 .218 .835  .544 -.009 .319 .568  .625 .170 .345 .383 
Dalits .621 .160 .531 .154  .575 .058 .346 .466  .475 -.163 .298 .703 
Adivasis .721 .382 .543 .057  .522 -.058 .379 .485  .606 .128 .441 .262 
Pakistanis .684 .301 .480 .123  .709 .355 .492 .090  .859 .689 .688 .001 





.668 .266 .372 .262  .761 .471 .417 .081  .312 -.524 .197 .950 
Homosexual
s 
.798 .552 .521 .020  .693 .319 .284 .381  .618 .154 .494 .188 
Transgender 
people 
.604 .124 .462 .240  .528 -.045 .330 .570  .558 .021 .429 .349 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
.593 .099 .362 .407  .675 .280 .490 .125  .724 .390 .488 .077 
Foreigners .819 .599 .520 .013  .727 .395 .537 .055  .801 .559 .537 .017 
Note. These questions asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor, member of their family, or a military leader or president. In 




Hierarchical Linear Regressions for India DMQ-A and DMQ-A Refined and Social Distance Items #1-3 Controlling for VSA and SDO 
   Neighbors    Member of your family  Military leader or president  





















Muslims 2. w/VSA & SDO .104 .026 .037 .162  .081 .000 .050 .088  .090 .010 .017 .423 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.266 .092 .162 .114  .262 .087 .181 .070  .312 .149 .222 .014 
Christians 2. w/VSA & SDO .157 .083 .047 .086  .099 .020 .051 .081  .105 .026 .015 .462 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.323 .162 .166 .072  .329 .169 .229 .010  .231 .049 .126 .304 
Dalits 2. w/VSA & SDO .167 .094 .155 .000  .116 .038 .037 .157  .090 .010 .050 .088 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.264 .090 .097 .489  .283 .112 .166 .092  .195 .004 .105 .503 
Adivasis 2. w/VSA & SDO .069 -.013 .016 .467  .211 .141 .030 .178  .120 .043 .073 .027 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.284 .114 .215 .023  .277 .106 .067 .763  .253 .075 .132 .248 
Pakistanis 2. w/VSA & SDO .169 .096 .107 .004  .230 .163 .146 .000  .237 .170 .147 .000 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.388 .243 .220 .007  .413 .274 .183 .018  .516 .401 .279 .000 
Kashmiris 2. w/VSA & SDO .124 .047 .074 .025  .124 .047 .019 .377  .084 .003 .009 .645 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.217 .031 .093 .582  .246 .066 .122 .318  .199 .009 .116 .411 
Someone from 
the North East 
of India 
2. w/VSA & SDO .077 -.004 .029 .240  .102 .023 .030 .229  .089 .008 .022 .331 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.204 .015 .127 .330  .145 -.059 .043 .967  .281 .110 .193 .045 
Homosexuals 2. w/VSA & SDO .199 .129 .077 .015  .197 .127 .067 .026  .183 .111 .116 .002 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.414 .274 .214 .006  .436 .302 .239 .002  .382 .235 .198 .015 
Transgender 
people 
2. w/VSA & SDO .104 .025 .064 .042  .219 .150 .057 .041  .088 .008 .022 .339 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.220 .035 .116 .385  .341 .185 .122 .213  .195 .003 .106 .488 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
2. w/VSA & SDO .124 .047 .054 .065  .113 .035 .050 .081  .195 .124 .081 .013 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.256 .079 .132 .248  .285 .115 .172 .077  .445 .314 .251 .001 
Foreigners 2. w/VSA & SDO .112 .034 .032 .196  .076 -.005 .040 .146  .206 .136 .053 .052 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.257 .081 .145 .183  .202 .012 .125 .341  .456 .327 .250 .001 
DMQ-A 
Refined 
Muslims 2. w/VSA & SDO .205 -.071 .039 .575  .278 .026 .012 .822  .244 -.018 .051 .474 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.655 .108 .449 .278  .725 .289 .447 .169  .764 .391 .520 .073 
Christians 2. w/VSA & SDO .360 .137 .079 .263  .265 .009 .040 .542  .324 .089 .044 .484 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.585 -.072 .225 .803  .575 -.097 .310 .643  .683 .180 .359 .361 
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Dalits 2. w/VSA & SDO .147 -.149 .057 .473  .249 -.012 .021 .728  .244 -.020 .067 .379 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.668 .143 .521 .184  .609 -.010 .360 .494  .552 -.158 .308 .679 
Adivasis 2. w/VSA & SDO .196 -.083 .018 .773  .158 -.135 .015 .817  .168 -.121 .003 .961 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.725 .291 .529 .109  .567 -.118 .409 .475  .616 .008 .448 .342 
Pakistanis 2. w/VSA & SDO .297 .052 .093 .241  .294 .049 .077 .303  .270 .016 .099 .231 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.694 .209 .397 .280  .741 .330 .447 .147  .877 .682 .607 .004 
Kashmiris 2. w/VSA & SDO .216 -.057 .141 .148  .084 -.234 .004 .957  .125 -.180 .018 .792 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.693 .207 .477 .189  .775 .418 .690 .024  .580 -.086 .455 .388 
Someone from 
the North East 
of India 
2. w/VSA & SDO .345 .117 .048 .442  .401 .193 .057 .352  .331 .099 .217 .040 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.674 .158 .329 .433  .853 .620 .452 .024  .627 .037 .296 .590 
Homosexuals 2. w/VSA & SDO .434 .237 .157 .060  .575 .427 .166 .022  .361 .139 .237 .026 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.833 .568 .399 .057  .775 .418 .200 .519  .760 .379 .398 .162 
Transgender 
people 
2. w/VSA & SDO .213 -.061 .070 .375  .405 .198 .207 .032  .137 -.163 .008 .900 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.630 .044 .417 .363  .738 .324 .333 .290  .590 -.059 .453 .374 
Immigrants 
/Migrants 
2. w/VSA & SDO .299 .055 .068 .345  .193 -.088 .008 .889  .259 .001 .023 .707 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.604 -.022 .305 .609  .709 .248 .516 .136  .745 .341 .486 .112 
Foreigners 2. w/VSA & SDO .397 .187 .098 .177  .222 -.049 .032 .628  .353 .129 .089 .225 
 3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.847 .604 .450 .028  .756 .369 .534 .075  .811 .513 .458 .054 
Notes. These questions asked participants how likely they would be to accept a person from each of these groups as their neighbor, member of their family, or a military leader or president. 
In bold are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 2), and DMQ 
themes in block three (i.e. model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
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Table H.28.                       
Hierarchical Linear Regression for U.S. DMQ-E and DMQ-A and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for Demographics 
  DMQ-E 
 
DMQ-A 








Change   







Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to 
shut down a group on social media, known for 
propagating hate speech against immigrants? 
.137 -.034 .120 1.085 .383 
  
.295 .147 .197 2.055 .033 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-
based group (supported by the government) 
responsible for policing your community for local 
traitors or enemies? 
.722 .667 .387 10.870 .000 
  
.567 .477 .250 4.247 .000 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a 
government policy that would forbid intermarriage 
between certain ethnic groups? 
.777 .733 .413 14.457 .000 
  
.634 .557 .377 7.587 .000 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy 
that allowed the government to censor journalists 
whenever it chose to? 
.197 .038 .169 1.642 .101 
  
.296 .148 .135 1.407 .186 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy 
that prevented refugees from coming to your 
country? 
.271 .127 .132 1.413 .182 
  
.234 .073 .146 1.408 .185 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police 
taking aggressive actions to remove illegal 
immigrants from the country? 
.609 .532 .311 6.229 .000 
  
.480 .371 .125 1.770 .073 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy 
that would require people to carry identification 
cards displaying one's ethnicity with them at all 
times? 
.752 .702 .380 11.972 .000 
  
.594 .509 .318 5.766 .000 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent people who have come to the U.S. 
from Mexico or Central America from...Moving into 
your neighborhood? 
.771 .726 .324 11.088 .000 
  
.630 .553 .386 7.690 .000 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent people who have come to the U.S. 
from Mexico or Central America from...Operating a 
business in your area? 
.809 .771 .470 19.250 .000 
  
.629 .552 .346 6.870 .000 
Q10. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent Blacks (African 
Americans) from... Moving into your neighborhood? 
.784 .741 .461 16.666 .000 
  
.623 .543 .350 6.822 .000 
Q11. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent Blacks (African 
Americans) from... Operating a business in your 
area? 
.838 .806 .492 23.754 .000 
  
.668 .599 .409 9.083 .000 
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e., model 2). Only results from 
model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.29.             
Hierarchical Linear Regression for U.S. DMQ-E and DMQ-A and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for VSA and SDO 
  DMQ-E  DMQ-A 


















Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to 
shut down a group on social media, known for 
propagating hate speech against immigrants? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .062 -.016 .046 2.306 .105  .116 .038 .018 .904 .408 
3. w/DMQ Themes .173 -.014 .110 1.018 .438  .299 .131 .183 1.874 .056 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-
based group (supported by the government) 
responsible for policing your community for local 
traitors or enemies? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .547 .509 .212 22.187 .000  .360 .303 .043 2.994 .055 
3. w/DMQ Themes .728 .667 .182 5.111 .000  .572 .469 .212 3.556 .000 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a 
government policy that would forbid intermarriage 
between certain ethnic groups? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .561 .524 .197 21.326 .000  .345 .287 .088 6.031 .003 
3. w/DMQ Themes .778 .728 .217 7.487 .000  .638 .550 .292 5.796 .000 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy 
that allowed the government to censor journalists 
whenever it chose to? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .057 -.022 .029 1.468 .236  .088 .007 .000 .012 .988 
3. w/DMQ Themes .257 .089 .200 2.054 .033  .241 .058 .153 1.452 .167 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy 
that prevented refugees from coming to your 
country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .220 .154 .080 4.880 .010  .088 .007 .000 .012 .988 
3. w/DMQ Themes .294 .135 .075 .808 .632  .241 .058 .153 1.452 .167 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police 
taking aggressive actions to remove illegal 
immigrants from the country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .507 .465 .209 20.141 .000  .368 .311 .013 .902 .409 
3. w/DMQ Themes .636 .554 .129 2.714 .005  .495 .374 .128 1.817 .065 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy 
that would require people to carry identification 
cards displaying one's ethnicity with them at all 
times? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .617 .585 .246 30.474 .000  .318 .257 .042 2.788 .067 
3. w/DMQ Themes .763 .709 .146 4.682 .000  .605 .510 .287 5.228 .000 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent people who have come to the U.S. 
from Mexico or Central America from...Moving 
into your neighborhood? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .631 .600 .184 23.768 .000  .378 .323 .134 9.677 .000 
3. w/DMQ Themes .785 .736 .153 5.436 .000  .633 .545 .255 4.995 .000 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent people who have come to the U.S. 
from Mexico or Central America from...Operating a 
business in your area? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .549 .511 .210 22.133 .000  .402 .349 .119 8.933 .000 
3. w/DMQ Themes .827 .787 .277 12.219 .000  .630 .541 .228 4.418 .000 
Q10. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent Blacks (African 
Americans) from... Moving into your 
neighborhood? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .511 .470 .189 18.349 .000  .341 .283 .068 4.667 .012 
3. w/DMQ Themes .793 .746 .282 10.427 .000  .629 .540 .288 5.584 .000 
Q11. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent Blacks (African 
Americans) from... Operating a business in your 
area? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .515 .475 .170 16.631 .000  .346 .288 .086 5.951 .004 
3. w/DMQ Themes .840 .804 .325 15.554 .000  .671 .591 .325 7.075 .000 
Note. In bold are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 2), and 
DMQ themes in block three (i.e. model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
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Table H.30.            
Hierarchical Linear Regression for S. Africa DMQ-E and DMQ-A and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for Demographics 
  DMQ-E   DMQ-A 






















Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to shut down a 
group on social media, known for propagating hate speech 
against immigrants? 
.268 .123 .196 2.092 .029 
 
.177 .023 .151 1.523 .137 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-based 
group (supported by the government) responsible for policing 
your community for local traitors or enemies? 
.315 .180 .207 2.360 .013 
 
.178 .024 .156 1.566 .122 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a 
government policy that would forbid intermarriage between 
certain ethnic groups? 
.327 .194 .271 3.148 .001 
 
.260 .122 .209 2.332 .014 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy that 
allowed the government to censor journalists whenever it 
chose to? 
.172 .008 .093 .881 .561 
 
.232 .088 .166 1.785 .068 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy that 
prevented refugees from coming to your country? 
.221 .067 .162 1.625 .106 
 
.136 -.026 .085 .810 .630 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police taking 
aggressive actions to remove illegal immigrants from the 
country? 
.279 .137 .245 2.660 .006 
 
.177 .023 .156 1.570 .121 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy that would 
require people to carry identification cards displaying one's 
race with them at all times? 
.276 .133 .115 1.246 .270 
 
.174 .020 .126 1.259 .261 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in action to 
prevent people who have come here from other countries in 
Africa from...Moving into your neighborhood 
.416 .301 .385 5.156 .000 
 
.233 .089 .151 1.623 .105 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in action to 
prevent people who have come here from other countries in 
Africa from......Operating a business in your area? 
.311 .175 .281 3.193 .001 
  
.205 .056 .168 1.750 .075  
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e., model 
2). Only results from model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.31.                         
Hierarchical Linear Regression for S. Africa DMQ-E and DMQ-A and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for VSA and SDO 
    DMQ-E  DMQ-A 






















Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to shut down a group on social 
media, known for propagating hate speech against immigrants? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .194 .126 .122 7.179 .001 
  
.034 -.044 .008 .407 .667 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.315 .160 .121 1.351 .212   .180 .006 .147 1.451 .165 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-based group (supported by the 
government) responsible for policing your community for local traitors or 
enemies? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .200 .132 .091 5.401 .006 
  
.046 -.030 .024 1.248 .291 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.331 .179 .131 1.497 .148   .184 .010 .138 1.368 .202 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a government policy that would 
forbid intermarriage between certain ethnic groups? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .240 .176 .184 11.493 .000   .052 -.024 .000 .013 .987 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.381 .241 .141 1.743 .078   .282 .128 .230 2.593 .007 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy that allowed the government 
to censor journalists whenever it chose to? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .096 .020 .017 .895 .412   .110 .039 .044 2.471 .090 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.174 -.013 .078 .723 .713   .240 .078 .130 1.386 .193 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy that prevented refugees from 
coming to your country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .095 .019 .036 1.910 .154   .072 -.002 .021 1.141 .324 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.232 .058 .137 1.363 .206   .145 -.038 .073 .687 .748 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police taking aggressive actions to 
remove illegal immigrants from the country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .152 .080 .118 6.588 .002   .034 -.043 .014 .704 .497 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.304 .146 .152 1.664 .096   .188 .015 .154 1.539 .132 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy that would require people to 
carry identification cards displaying one's race with them at all times? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .178 .109 .018 1.045 .356   .055 -.021 .006 .325 .723 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.276 .113 .098 1.035 .424   .179 .003 .124 1.223 .284 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who 
have come here from other countries in Africa from...Moving into your 
neighborhood 
2. w/VSA & SDO .226 .161 .195 11.967 .000   .133 .064 .051 2.962 .056 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.428 .299 .202 2.691 .005   .281 .127 .147 1.659 .096 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who 
have come here from other countries in Africa from......Operating a business in 
your area? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .125 .051 .095 5.146 .008   .108 .036 .071 3.986 .022 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.317 .162 .192 2.140 .026   .268 .112 .160 1.774 .071 
Note. In bold are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 2 (i.e. model 2), and 
DMQ themes in block three (i.e. model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
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Table H.32.      
Hierarchical Linear Regression for India DMQ-E and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling 
for Demographics 









Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to 
shut down a group on social media, known for 
propagating hate speech against immigrants? 
.183 .024 .105 1.016 .439 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a 
community-based group (supported by the 
government) responsible for policing your 
community for local traitors or enemies? 
.290 .151 .189 2.107 .028 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a 
government policy that would forbid intermarriage 
between certain ethnic groups? 
.502 .405 .273 4.339 .000 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a 
policy that allowed the government to censor 
journalists whenever it chose to? 
.220 .067 .111 1.123 .354 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy 
that prevented refugees from coming to your 
country? 
.276 .135 .214 2.340 .014 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police 
taking aggressive actions to remove illegal 
immigrants from the country? 
.324 .192 .240 2.811 .004 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a 
policy that would require people to carry 
identification cards displaying one's religious 
affiliation/membership with them at all times? 
.523 .430 .311 5.155 .000 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent Muslims from... Moving into 
your neighborhood? 
.373 .250 .214 2.703 .005 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent Muslims from... Operating a 
business in your area? 
.319 .185 .185 2.148 .025 
Q10. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent people from the North East of 
India (ex. from Assam) from... Moving into your 
neighborhood? 
.444 .335 .319 4.542 .000 
Q11. How likely is it that you would take part in 
action to prevent people from the North East of 
India (ex. from Assam) from... Operating a 
business in your area? 
.478 .376 .225 3.404 .001 
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 
1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e. model 2). Only results from model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.33.       
Hierarchical Linear Regression for India DMQ-E and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for VSA and SDO  






F Change Sig. F 
Change 
Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to shut down a group on social 
media, known for propagating hate speech against immigrants? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .123 .050 .045 2.468 .090 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.239 .069 .116 1.173 .318 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-based group (supported by the 
government) responsible for policing your community for local traitors or enemies? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .140 .069 .039 2.205 .116 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.300 .144 .160 1.769 .072 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a government policy that would 
forbid intermarriage between certain ethnic groups? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .397 .347 .168 13.380 .000 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.520 .413 .124 1.992 .039 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy that allowed the government to 
censor journalists whenever it chose to? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .122 .048 .013 .694 .502 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.250 .083 .129 1.329 .223 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy that prevented refugees from 
coming to your country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .091 .015 .029 1.540 .220 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.293 .135 .202 2.207 .021 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police taking aggressive actions to 
remove illegal immigrants from the country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .164 .094 .080 4.573 .013 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.337 .188 .173 2.013 .037 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy that would require people to 
carry identification cards displaying one's religious affiliation/membership with 
them at all times? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .321 .264 .108 7.661 .001 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.531 .427 .210 3.468 .001 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent Muslims from... 
Moving into your neighborhood? 
 
2. w/VSA & SDO .245 .183 .087 5.539 .005 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.407 .275 .162 2.112 .028 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent Muslims from... 
Operating a business in your area? 
 
2. w/VSA & SDO .167 .097 .033 1.917 .153 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.320 .167 .153 1.735 .079 
Q10. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people from the 
North East of India (ex. from Assam) from... Moving into your neighborhood? 
 
2. w/VSA & SDO .238 .174 .113 7.132 .001 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.476 .359 .238 3.506 .000 
Q11. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people from the 
North East of India (ex. from Assam) from... Operating a business in your area? 
2. w/VSA & SDO .306 .249 .053 3.666 .029 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
.482 .366 .175 2.613 .006 
Note. In bold are model 3 p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1), VSA and SDO variables in block 
2 (i.e. model 2), and DMQ themes in block three (i.e. model 3). Results from model 2 and 3 are reported. 
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Table H.34.            
Hierarchical Linear Regression for India DMQ-A and DMQ-A Refined and Additional Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for Demographics 





















Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to shut down a group 




.030 .125 1.163 .325  .497 -.114 .411 1.038 .465 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-based group 
(supported by the government) responsible for policing your 
community for local traitors or enemies? 
.35
5 
.221 .219 2.533 .008  .771 .493 .600 3.339 .018 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a government policy 
that would forbid intermarriage between certain ethnic groups? 
.40
5 
.282 .254 3.188 .001  .724 .390 .314 1.449 .254 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy that allowed the 
government to censor journalists whenever it chose to? 
.28
2 
.133 .202 2.096 .029  .591 .095 .336 1.045 .461 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy that prevented 
refugees from coming to your country? 
.20
7 
.042 .122 1.142 .341  .677 .285 .461 1.815 .146 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police taking aggressive 
actions to remove illegal immigrants from the country? 
.25
8 
.104 .161 1.613 .110  .471 -.171 .321 .774 .661 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy that would 
require people to carry identification cards displaying one's religious 
affiliation/membership with them at all times? 
.43
7 
.320 .283 3.744 .000  .552 .008 .426 1.211 .362 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent 
Muslims from... Moving into your neighborhood? 
.37
3 
.243 .246 2.930 .003  .725 .391 .426 1.974 .116 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent 
Muslims from... Operating a business in your area? 
.31
2 
.169 .209 2.262 .018  .700 .335 .361 1.531 .224 
Q10. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent 
people from the North East of India (ex. from Assam) from... Moving 
into your neighborhood? 
.40
1 
.276 .348 4.333 .000  .719 .378 .296 1.340 .298 
Q11. How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent 
people from the North East of India (ex. from 
Assam) from... Operating a business in your area? 
.22
6 
.066 .184 1.777 .071  .531 -.040 .254 .687 .731 
Note. In bold are p-values that are less that .05. These regressions included demographic variables in block 1 (i.e., model 1) and DMQ themes in block two (i.e. model 
2). Only results from model 2 are reported. 
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Table H.35.             
Hierarchical Linear Regression for India DMQ-A and DMQ-A Refined and Add. Behavioral Intention Items Controlling for VSA and SDO 
  DMQ-A  DMQ-A Refined 

















Q1. How likely would you be to sign a petition to shut 
down a group on social media, known for propagating 
hate speech against immigrants? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.117 0.039 0.046 2.35 0.101  0.138 -0.162 0.052 0.693 0.51 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.203 0.014 0.086 0.783 0.656  0.621 0.021 0.483 1.391 0.289 
Q2. How likely would you be to join a community-based 
group (supported by the government) responsible for 
policing your community for local traitors or enemies? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.148 0.074 0.013 0.672 0.513  0.184 -0.1 0.013 0.188 0.83 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.473 0.347 0.324 4.47 0.000  0.799 0.481 0.615 3.342 0.024 
Q3. How likely would you be to vote in favor of a 
government policy that would forbid intermarriage 
between certain ethnic groups? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.228 0.16 0.077 4.518 0.013  0.467 0.281 0.056 1.205 0.318 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.428 0.292 0.2 2.541 0.008  0.791 0.461 0.325 1.697 0.188 
Q4. How likely would you vote in favor of a policy that 
allowed the government to censor journalists whenever it 
chose to? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.146 0.071 0.066 3.532 0.033  0.408 0.202 0.152 2.962 0.072 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.314 0.151 0.168 1.782 0.071  0.67 0.148 0.262 0.866 0.59 
Q5. How likely would you be to support a policy that 
prevented refugees from coming to your country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.121 0.043 0.036 1.845 0.164  0.22 -0.051 0.004 0.065 0.938 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.273 0.101 0.153 1.53 0.137  0.707 0.242 0.486 1.809 0.162 
Q6. How likely would you be to support the police taking 
aggressive actions to remove illegal immigrants from the 
country? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.118 0.041 0.022 1.114 0.333  0.258 0 0.109 1.683 0.208 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.272 0.099 0.154 1.537 0.135  0.519 -0.243 0.26 0.59 0.804 
Q7. How likely would you be to oppose to a policy that 
would require people to carry identification cards 
displaying one's religious affiliation/membership with 
them at all times? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.217 0.148 0.063 3.633 0.03  0.2 -0.078 0.074 1.071 0.359 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.463 0.336 0.247 3.341 0.001  0.703 0.233 0.503 1.846 0.153 
Q8. How likely is it that you would take part in action 
to prevent Muslims from... Moving into your 
neighborhood? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.181 0.109 0.054 3.011 0.054  0.329 0.096 0.031 0.527 0.597 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.397 0.253 0.215 2.596 0.007  0.73 0.303 0.401 1.619 0.21 
Q9. How likely is it that you would take part in action 
to prevent Muslims from... Operating a business in your 
area? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.151 0.076 0.048 2.569 0.082  0.342 0.113 0.003 0.057 0.945 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.318 0.156 0.167 1.781 0.071  0.723 0.285 0.381 1.504 0.247 
Q10. How likely is it that you would take part in action 
to prevent people from the North East of India (ex. from 
Assam) from... Moving into your neighborhood? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.14 0.065 0.088 4.654 0.012  0.461 0.273 0.037 0.792 0.465 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.413 0.274 0.273 3.384 0.001  0.766 0.395 0.305 1.422 0.277 
Q11. How likely is it that you would take part in action 
to prevent people from the North East of India (ex. from 
Assam) from... Operating a business in your area? 
2. w/VSA & SDO 0.073 0.009 0.031 1.521 0.224  0.358 0.134 0.081 1.444 0.257 
3. w/DMQ 
Themes 
0.231 0.049 0.159 1.503 0.147  0.566 -0.122 0.208 0.523 0.854 
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APPENDIX I 
DMQ ITEM RESIDUALS FROM LINEAR REGRESSIONS 
 
Table I.36. 
DMQ Item Residuals from Linear Regressions       
DMQ 
# 










27 XE It’s wrong to believe ideas from foreign countries. .009 -.024 -.257 -.658 -.313 
3 WE A certain group of other people is taking the places 
and positions in our society that should be reserved 
for our people. 
.125 -.099 -.091 -.507 -.232 
17 XE Foreigners are to blame for our country's failures. -.071 .130 -.336 -.465 -.224 
18 XE Foreigners are trying to steal our lands. .119 -.046 -.261 -.351 -.219 
35 II Our country is the center of civilization. .149 -.285 -.068 -.301 -.218 
51 TT Those among us who reject our people's beliefs 
should be called traitors. 
.056 -.091 -.158 -.405 -.218 
60 TT We should hold an entire group accountable for the 
actions of some of its members. 
-.077 -.315 -.045 -.261 -.207 
29 IB My ethnic group is a good people, who have never 
done any real harm to anyone. 
-.009 -.352 -.227 .013 -.189 
46 PT The world has two kinds of people: our enemies and 
our friends. 
.277 -.153 -.254 -.047 -.151 
54 II We have a holy right to our language and our way of 
life. 
.087 -.308 -.266 .141 -.144 
37 TT People from our group who associate with people 
from more troublesome groups are a special kind of 
traitor. 
.143 -.152 -.198 -.078 -.143 
7 WE A group of people has been made wealthy by 
stealing from us, and they must pay us back 
completely. 
.243 -.162 .206 -.439 -.131 
57 II We must regain the great honor, dignity, and glory 
of the ancient civilization created by our people. 
.325 -.110 -.140 -.120 -.123 
36 II Our people are entitled, by divine destiny, to certain 
areas of land and soil. 
.278 -.085 .068 -.344 -.120 
15 TT Criticizing our leader makes you an enemy of our 
country. 
.031 .410 -.171 -.572 -.111 
10 TT Anyone who shows kindness to the enemy is a 
traitor. 
.070 .213 -.139 -.378 -.102 
33 WE One ethnic group is secretly controlling our 
government behind the scenes. 
.127 -.034 .040 -.290 -.095 
62 PT We should never let ourselves be ruled by people 
from certain ethnic groups. 
.167 .042 -.011 -.298 -.089 
25 II It is our divine mission to transform our country into 
a paradise, our own Promised Land. 
.161 -.169 -.025 -.069 -.088 
56 II We must maintain the purity of our ethnic group. .301 -.160 .024 -.120 -.085 
8 PU A successful political movement is one that will 
sweep away the bad and purify the country. 
.489 .346 -.274 -.253 -.060 
28 SB Many of the bad events that have been happening in 
this country are due to the activities of foreign 
agents. 
.103 -.019 -.105 -.045 -.056 
16_r PT Every human is partly good and partly bad -- there 
are no bad people separate from the good people. 
-1.716 -.394 .163 .391 -.054 
31 ST My homeland is so great and holy that saving it 
would justify the spilling of a lot of blood. 
.187 -.047 .002 -.072 -.039 
13 PV Complete destruction is necessary for great 
reconstruction. 
.085 -.003 .041 -.122 -.028 
2 RV A certain ethnic group should be separated from us, 
so as to prevent any contaminating contact. 
-.187 -.104 -.075 .101 -.026 
24 PV If people don't agree with us, violence is the best -.039 .369 -.166 -.274 -.023 
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way to deal with the problem. 
39 SB So-called refugees are really infiltrators who 
threaten the culture, language, and very existence of 
our country. 
.242 .053 -.044 -.068 -.020 
19 PV God wants us, for the sake of good, to hate a certain 
group of people. 
-.165 -.173 .118 -.004 -.020 
22 XE Ideally, our country would consist of people with 
just one language, religion, and culture. 
-.089 .050 -.104 .073 .006 
53 PV We are now in a fight-to-the-death between two 
worlds, two religions, two civilizations. 
.042 .042 -.133 .118 .009 
20 PU I believe it is a citizen's duty to report troublemakers 
to the government because this maintains stability 
and security. 
.238 -.052 .066 .038 .017 
21 XE I get disgusted when people start praising the culture 
of some other country. 
.161 .460 -.027 -.355 .026 
42 RV Some groups of people cannot be civilized. -.126 -.085 .121 .095 .044 
14 PU Correct principles must triumph, without making 
any compromises. 
.315 .159 -.098 .077 .046 
59 SB We should be alert: The principal enemy of our 
civilization is living right here among us, in this 
nation. 
.367 .053 -.047 .147 .051 
23 PT If our nation is to survive, we must go now on a 
military offensive. 
.154 .281 -.122 .034 .065 
49 WE There is a global conspiracy threatening the survival 
of my people. 
.289 .336 -.138 .012 .070 
34 RV Only some groups are capable of true art and 
science. 
.086 .061 .157 .038 .085 
9_r PT An important job of the media is to critique our 
police and military, so that we can constantly work 
to improve them. 
-1.752 -.317 -.081 .141 .086 
58 PV We need war to fix the problems with this country, 
and those who don't agree are traitors. 
.014 .340 -.167 .096 .090 
44 PU Some ideas can poison the virgin minds of our 
youth. 
.062 -.243 .073 .461 .097 
50 PV There is one group that is destined to be the master 
and rule over the entire world. 
.098 .296 .258 -.249 .102 
41 WE Some groups of people are instinctively submissive 
to other groups of people. 
-.046 -.377 .358 .379 .120 
5 SB A certain group, seemingly loyal, works to corrupt 
and damage our country from within. 
.149 -.051 .089 .337 .125 
40 RV Some groups are destined to vanish, because they 
are inferior. 
.143 .072 .129 .194 .132 
4 SB A certain group, one could say, is sucking the blood 
of our people. 
.358 .390 .096 -.040 .148 
47 PT There are bad people who must be sorted out from 
the good, and dealt with forcefully. 
.288 .028 .150 .280 .152 
26 ST It is sometimes important to kill many people, in 
order to preserve a great many more. 
.072 .335 -.002 .166 .167 
12 RV Certain groups of people lack the essential traits that 
would entitle them to civil and political rights, or to 
equal treatment. 
.170 .219 .094 .205 .173 
45 ST Sometimes it is necessary to be harsh and cruel in 
the name of the life and progress of the nation. 
.278 .185 .199 .146 .176 
61 TT We should imprison those journalists whose 
writings are demoralizing the public. 
.232 .152 .054 .354 .187 
1 WE Most of our people sit by, while a certain group of 
wealthy elitists take control of all the positions of 
power 
.391 .244 .420 -.093 .191 
6 SB A certain race wants to exterminate our race. .028 .123 .155 .296 .191 
55 PU We may sometimes need to repress certain political 
movements that disturb national unity. 
.179 .152 .173 .276 .200 
52_r ST Torture is never acceptable. 1.857 .617 -.141 .136 .204 
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43 SB Some groups of people in our country are out to 
sabotage the country. 
.161 .139 .021 .530 .230 
48 ST There are times and places where torture is 
acceptable. 
.054 .329 .102 .357 .262 
30_r IB My ethnic group, I must admit, has done 
considerable harm to others. 
1.212 .716 .281 -.189 .269 
38_r PT Progress and success always require making 
compromise with the opposition. 
1.810 .706 .126 .045 .292 
11 ST Certain groups of people have savage customs. .304 .104 .430 .549 .361 
63 PU Whenever an ideology or political party is full of 
dangerous and wrong ideas, it should be eliminated. 
.308 .099 .257 .766 .374 
32_r RV No race of people is better or superior to any other 
race. 
0.44 .240 .429 .458 .376 
Notes. Res - residuals. IN - India. U.S. - United States. SA - South Africa. Themes: RV – racialist views, XE – 
xenophobia, TT – traitor talk, SB – sabotage, WE – wealthy elite, PV – pro-violence, ST – support of torture, PT – 
polarized thinking, II – in-group idealization, PU – purity of thought, IB – in-group blamelessness. For the "Average 
Res" column, the average residual is calculated across the three countries, using the refined residuals for India, and the 
residuals for the U.S. and South Africa. The items here are sorted by lowed to highest average residual. In bold are the 
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